Sunday, May 20, 2012

Germany Worries About Its Gold Reserves


Philipp Missfelder, member of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union, tried to inspect German gold reserves stored in New York, but was not given access. (Getty Images)

German politicians and accounting bodies want more guarantees concerning the security of Germany’s gold reserves, with Germany’s federal audit office due to report to the finance committee of the German Parliament on the matter.

Germany’s gold reserves may prove a powerful weapon in the troubled world economy.
(Thomas Coex/AFP/Getty Images)

Gold skyrocketed to over us$1,800 an ounce on Tuesday. One nation gained powerfully as a result: Germany.

As the markets fixate on Europe, seeking to understand the complexities involved in Franco-German moves to stabilize the eurozone and hence the global economy, little attention has been paid to a crucial component of German power in this whole equation—Germany’s gold hoard.

Did the Holy Roman Empire Plan the Greek Crisis? by Gerald Flurry

The Greek riots are a sign of a far greater upheaval that is threatening to engulf much of Europe.
(Aris Messinis/AFP/Getty Images)

I’d like to add my thoughts to a critical article written by Richard Palmer, titled “Who Will Stop the Greece Fires?” It was placed on our website Dec. 16, 2008.

Italy Calls in the Army to Protect Tax Collectors

Italy’s Interior Minister Anna Maria Cancellieri announced May 13 that Equitalia, the private company that collects taxes, and Finmeccanica, an aerospace and defense conglomerate, may receive military protection after they were attacked by anarchists.

Cancellieri warned that the army may also need to protect Italy’s high-speed rail network.

Twitter. Trends. Nigeria

#somewhereinNigeria

In one sudden flash, young Nigerians have taken to Twitter like an army of vultures on post-World War II Japan. The last couple of months have witnessed such an influx of opinion makers and shameless attention-seekers to the Twittersphere, that one wouldn’t be surprised if the elderly ones start to challenge the younger ones thus: “Don’t you know I started using Twitter before you?” A daily dose of Twittercetamol always leaves one energized with entertaining contributions from ALIBABAGCFR, Denrele Edun, Don Jazzy, Eggheader, Ogundamisi, Tolu Ogunlesi, Chinedu Ekeke, MrFixNigeria and several others. No day is complete without the endless list of people begging D’banj and Darey for a retweet; no day is complete without ALIBABA’s knock-knock jokes; no day is complete without MrFixNigeria making new enemies with occasional provocative tweets, and you can trust Chinedu Ekeke and co to take him to the cleaners within seconds. Twitter is always fun, but today things are getting serious.

Senator Bukola Saraki spoke to Omojuwa.com’s Japh and Fiyinfoluwa Elegbede. We spoke on issues ranging from his current travails with the police, the Senate and it’s allowances, the competence (or otherwise of president Jonathan), his tenure as Kwara State Governor and the issues around the N21 billion loan saga amongst others.

Still on Failing State & Fading Peacekeepers by Nasir El-Rufai

Last week’s column on our nation’s peacekeeping failures ruffled more than a few feathers both within the defence establishment and corridors of executive power. That was expected, because when those wasting our resources in the name of our defence become exposed in the way our peacekeeping capacity has rapidly deteriorated, all kinds of motives will be imputed to divert attention from the wanton looting of the defence and security budgets going on between the presidency and the agencies concerned.

Between Terrorism and Corruption – Implications For Nigeria : Paper Presented by Nasir El-Rufai

Between Terrorism and Corruption – Implications for Nigeria
(Draft for Discussion)
Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai
Protocols
Introduction
I am pleased to be with the Silver Knights this afternoon to share my thoughts about two issues that confront our nation – terrorism and corruption. As a well-known opposition figure, I want to state clearly that the views expressed here are mine, and not of the political party I belong to – the Congress for Progressive Change. Secondly, my opinions are based on my interpretation of facts on the ground and research done by others, and not driven by politics.

To Your Tents, O Nigerians! By Faith Abiodun

Why is everyone tired of Nigeria? Rather, why shouldn’t they be tired of Nigeria?

It was about 8:30am and I needed to make a quick stop on my 4-hour drive from Syracuse to the United Nations headquarters in New York City. I pulled over at the closest gas station somewhere around Philadelphia and went into the store to conduct quick business. Ten minutes later, I emerged with my breakfast and set about resuming my trip, but wait, I needed to grab an extra bottle of water. I went back into the store and returned with a bottle but noticed someone tailing me as I exited. I swung around and came face to face with a young man who was smiling intently at me. Wait a minute, what’s this about?

Musings From 35,000 Feet By Faith Abiodun

I’m sitting precariously at 35,000 feet above the earth, on a Delta Airlines flight from Atlanta, Georgia to Syracuse, New York; thinking back on the activities of the weekend. I was at an event in Columbia, South Carolina on Saturday where former US President, Bill Clinton was guest speaker. I’ve always been fascinated by the Clintons, and it’s barely three weeks since I was listening to Hillary talk about the role of young people in building a better world. Hillary spoke directly to me on Monday April 23, 2012 when she said “Be skeptical, but don’t be cynical”. She was talking about why young people need to be engaged with

Rashidi Yekini Was Murdered By Segun Odegbami

This is one of the most difficult articles I have ever written.

I now believe that the universe sought me out some months ago for an assignment, to bear witness and to testify in the unfolding events surrounding the life and death of Rashidi Yekini! But why me?
Within the football circle I believe I am one of a very few persons that Rashidi Yekini was comfortable with. Secondly, in the past three months I have had the closest interaction with the man up till the time I received the shocking information that he had died. I could not relate the news with the circumstances of his life during this period. Some things simply did not fit the picture being painted. And someone needed to testify, clarify and debunk the ugly and false stories being peddled around to justify Rashidi’s death.

Since I received a call from him three months ago, I have learnt a great deal more about him, the things that happened to him, why he lived his life the way he did, that he was not physically or mentally unstable, that he ran into some misfortune and that he needed support and help to get back on his feet. I have known Rashidi since our days together in the Shooting Stars FC team in Ibadan, when as twin strikers in the 1984 African Club championship we had terrorised defenders all over Africa, freely banging in goals on our way to that year’s finals where we lost! That was to be my last year with Shooting Stars and indeed with football. It was his first year!

Beyond that we had kept a good relationship from a distance. Through the years I had tried to understand his choices of the kind of life he lived without criticising or even counselling him. His decision to join Abiola Babes FC of Abeokuta, his choice of going to play in Cote D’Ivoire, moving to Europe, making the Chairman of Africa Sports FC of Abidjan, an Ivorien, his agent and manager throughout his career, all were totally of his own independent making. This clearly defined his character, that in spite of his obvious limitation in terms of academic capacity from the onset, he left no one in doubt that he was his own man and would choose his own path. He was very fiercely independent minded, never getting involved in the agitations, the politics, the power-play and the intrigues between officials and players, and even amongst the players themselves. All he cared about was to get on the field where he was extremely competitive and play football. He loved scoring goals and hardly ever exuberantly celebrated his goals. Thats why his first goal in the World Cup of 1994, against Bulgaria, and the manner he celebrated it remained the most memorable picture of that years’ championship.

As a player Rashidi was as reclusive as could possibly be. In camp players, that players had to share rooms in pairs, was the reason he lived with anyone. He was that kind of person. He would have preferred to be alone and enjoyed the solitude of his chosen way of life. Football gave him the only outlet to the rest of the world. Otherwise, you would find him sleeping, or saying his prayers, or playing pranks and cracking jokes with the players that visited his room.
Beyond football, Rashidi did not want anyone coming too close to him, to know too much and to meddle in his business. He kept his activities very close to his chest. So, even as we interacted as often as certain events brought us together I noticed his cautiousness. He was a very sensitive person. he tried never to hurt anyone, preferring to cut off any relationships that threatened his regimented sequestered lifestyle. One thing I was very sure of about him was that he never asked anything from anyone, and never wanted to depend on anyone for anything.

Football for him had provided all his needs. In short, for Rashidi Yekini, football was everything and the only thing in his life. It offered him the opportunity to escape from the pangs of poverty and he decided that the safest and best way to secure his future was not to fall victim to any smart Alecs, or scammers, or fraudsters, or business persons with sweet tongues that could talk him into parting with his hard-earned money. He did not want to be used or confused. So he built an impregnable wall around his existence, trusting only very few (he felt safer amongst the Hausa community, and did most of his very few business dealings with them). He worst fear was to lose his money. Thats why his celebrated one and only marriage crumbled after 3 months. He did not trust the motive of his wife for marrying him. So, he left the marriage before it even started. The same attitude underlined his relationship even with his family members. He took care of them, and provided for them, but from a safe distance.

t was a dangerous mixture – to be rich and famous and to be reclusive. Stories were bound to regale such an existence and with Rashidi they came in torrents. Yet, I fully I respected his choice of life and how he chose to live it, even though my every instinct wanted to support and guide him through the turbulences that I knew he would have to face managing unprecedented fame and fortune for a young man coming from his background.

No one knew this whole scenario would become the apparatus for his tragic end.
Rashidi’s death now raises many questions with no answers. The stories about his state of mind have clouded the circumstances of his death that should have been thoroughly investigated to show how, where, why he died the way he did.

I know a mad man when I see one. I can testify unequivocally along with some others that knew Rashidi from close-up that there was nothing wrong with him at the time he was abducted and died. Indeed, he was hale and hearty. Rashidi was not ill. He was fit and sound of mind and body. He even trained on the day he was forcefully taken away by people that have not come out to tell the world why they took him, where they took him, what happened there, who treated him for what ailment, what he died of, and so on. I can also testify that it was the misfortune that befell him a few years ago, that caused him great distress to the extent that he almost lost his life and his mind when his partner was killed and he lost most of his investment in their joint venture. That period was what some of his family members are saying to justify their wicked action in forcefully leading him to his death.

Rashidi was very so much into himself. He had very few close friends and kept even them in the dark about his plight and pains, preferring to deal with the issues himself. So, he did some ‘irrational’ things. So what?. Who would not do irrational things if they lost almost their entire fortune in one fell swoop? It took Rashidi a while to get over it (some two years or so). Playing his football daily, watching movies at his closest friend’s video shop, seeking some spiritual help, avoiding the public and public places, and bearing his own grief alone gradually eased the pain.
Thats where his life was when from out of the blues he rang me up. Rashidi had never done that in all our relationship. I was the one who always did the initial contacting. But some three months ago, he called me himself, and so started a new relationship that was going to bring Rashidi Yekini back to the game he loved with uncommon passion. I had assured him, after he had assured me he would fully cooperate, that he would never be far away from the game again. I assured him that the game could still help restore his lost fortunes. That he had to play it differently this time with kids as his instruments of change. He would help to nurture them, by showing and teaching them how to do the things he did best – position himself at the right place at the right time, evade tackles, and shoot accurately and powerfully with both feet, and score goals on the field of play. He was excited and raring to go. We had started discussing with companies and organisations in Lagos that would provide funds and logistical support.

Then everything came to a shuddering halt. The light of our great dreams was extinguished last week. The news came that a hale and hearty Rashidi, who finished training one evening, and had driven himself home, had been abducted by some family members, taken to an unknown destination for medical purposes, kept there for weeks without anyone’s knowledge but the perpetrators of the act, had died under circumstances that no one has been able to explain to the public.

Again let me emphasise: Rashidi was not sick at the time he was abducted. Rashidi was never mad. He could have had periods of some depression but those were in the distant past. The Rashidi that I saw, drove in his car, sat with for over one hour planning for the future, that called me up several times after that, that met with my emissaries after that, that kept in touch even with my office, that I wrote about in my column some 5 weeks ago, was not sick, or ill, or suffering illusions, or delusions, or hallucinations.
I am here testifying that Rashidi must have been ‘killed’ either ignorantly, deliberately or even inadvertently by those that did not understand what was going on with him, that had their own motivation for doing what they did by forcefully taking him away to an unknown destination for some kind of unclear, unauthorised spiritual or medical intervention that eventually killed him. That neighbours even witnessed the abduction and described it in gory detail requires that the law enforcement agencies should take up the matter immediately, to investigate what exactly happened and why Nigeria’s national hero and treasure, an African football legend in the true sense, should die the way he did.

Rashidi will not rest properly until justice is done.
Rashidi’s death must not be swept under the carpet. He died under circumstances that reek of conspiracy and murder!
That's why the police must step in today!
Culled from Mathematical 7 (Segun Odegbami’s blog)

Britain Tells Germany to Rearm by Richard Palmer

Britain’s military establishment has a shockingly shallow grasp of history. British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond said Germany must recognize “that it can’t continue to be the dominant economy in Europe without also significantly increasing its military capability,” after talks with his German counterpart Thomas de Maiziere in Germany, May 2

Merkel and Monti Revive Old Berlin-Rome Axis by Ron Fraser

Ron Fraser examines the next step for Germany as it has already lost an ally in Nicholas Sarkozy as he lost the election to Francois Hollande. Angela Merkel looks to Mario Monti for a new partnership.

Sixty years of work by European elites to create a united Europe consummated recently in two events that bring the seventh and final resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire much closer to being a current-day reality.

First, the “Berlin Group,” a fringe EU group of nations formed out of a German idea promoting the regular meeting of foreign ministers of the European Union’s leading economies (excluding Britain), recently launched the idea of creating the office of a European supremo.

This Is Germany’s Moment! by Brad MacDonald

In this article Brad MacDonald provides an insight into events around Europe and what steps the Germans are taking to take full advantage. Happy reading.

It appears the current phase of Europe’s debt crisis is entering its last hour. We’ll know soon, but it’s possible the weekend of May 5, 2012, will be remembered as a transformative moment in the history of Europe.

Once again, the nation at the center of it all is Germany.

On Sunday, a noteworthy chain of events will culminate in France’s run-off presidential election. While many of the events in this chain appear unrelated, with each unfurling in its own distinct way in a city or within a government in a different country, they’re threaded through with a common theme: frustration with Germany, and specifically, Berlin’s unrelenting demand for Sparmaßnahmen (austerity).

Russia's Strategy by George Friedman

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 reversed a process that had been under way since the Russian Empire's emergence in the 17th century. It was ultimately to incorporate four general elements: Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Siberia. The St. Petersburg-Moscow axis was its core, and Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine were its center of gravity. The borders were always dynamic, mostly expanding but periodically contracting as the international situation warranted. At its farthest extent, from 1945 to 1989, it reached central Germany, dominating the lands it seized in World War II. The Russian Empire was never at peace. As with many empires, there were always parts of it putting up (sometimes violent) resistance and parts that bordering powers coveted -- as well as parts of other nations that Russia coveted.

Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte announced that his Cabinet would resign April 23. The announcement came after the government failed to agree on budget cuts with its key partner the Party for Freedom, whose support had boosted the minority coalition to a parliamentary majority.

China-Philippines Standoff Intensifies

From theTrumpet.com

China’s belligerency is on display on the world stage once again.

Beijing intensified a 10-day standoff between the Philippines and China on Friday by sending a third ship to a shoal in the South China Sea where both sides claim sovereignty.

From theTrumpet.com Another idea from the ‘Berlin Club’

A group of EU foreign ministers discussed the idea of merging the European Union’s top jobs into one on April 19, the EU Observer reports, coining the term “super-president” to describe the new top job.

The jobs of European Council president, currently held by Herman Van Rompuy, and European Commission president, currently held by José Manuel Barroso, may be merged. “The new super-president would also chair General Affairs Councils (gacs)—monthly meetings of foreign ministers which discuss internal Union affairs,” writes the EU Observer. Its source reports that experts believe this can be done without a treaty change.

The idea emerged from a meeting of 10 EU foreign ministers organized by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle to discuss closer European integration. Sometimes called the “Berlin Club,” the group usually has 11 members: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain. The French foreign minister, however, was not able to attend this last meeting.

These ministers see that for Europe to become better integrated it needs a strong central leader. As the euro crisis pushes those nations that are committed to remaining in the euro closer together, watch for this idea to become more popular. Europe knows it needs a strong central leader to respond to the dangers of today’s world.

With Submarines against Pirates

German government advisors are pleading for using submarines in the war on piracy at the Horn of Africa. Thanks to their "highly modern sensor technology," German submarines are not only capable of "covertly observing the pirates' vessels" and following their course, but also of "observing the pirates' potential bases both day and night," according to a statement just published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). The bases could therefore be attacked with greater precision, as the EU decided Friday - in spite of warnings that this could lead to a further escalation of the conflict in Somalia. Geostrategic considerations are at the core of the militarization projects, being promoted by the Bundeswehr. The Indian Ocean has become extremely important in global policy and it will play a pivotal role in future conflicts with China. Under no circumstances should the "new momentum in the greater region of the Indian Ocean" be neglected, warns the director of the SWP. Military strategists are underlining the importance of a strong naval presence in the ocean between Africa and Southeast Asia.

In Violation of International Law

The appeal of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) for new militarization projects corresponds to the decision taken by the EU's foreign ministers last Friday, to combat piracy also on shore in the future. According to this decision, not the pirates themselves, but their weapons, vessels, fuel and even food supplies should be attacked and destroyed. This should be permitted "on shore," but the military seeks to avoid clarifying, what exactly is meant by "shore," and what is being targeted. The Federal Cabinet plans to endorse these new regulations on Wednesday and the endorsement by the German Bundestag should follow as soon as possible. Experts had explicitly warned against the extension of the mandate, fearing an uncontrollable escalation of the conflict. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.) Even parliamentarians of the opposition, who, in principle, support the war on piracy, point to the illegality of on shore military attacks on pirates. Reinhard Buetikofer (Green Party) reminds that pirates are "criminals and not enemy combatants." To "attack them on land, without them posing a direct danger, is simply in violation of international law."

Combat Unit "Berlin"

These regulations are of particular importance to Germany, not only because of the endorsement by Berlin's foreign minister, but also because of the prominent role the Bundeswehr is currently playing in the EU Operation Atalanta. The Bundeswehr had just dispatched its combat unit logistical support vessel "Berlin" to the Horn of Africa - "not as a logistical support vessel, but as a combat unit," the German Armed Forces underlined. The "Berlin" is therefore carrying more personnel than usual - military police and a so-called boarding team, but also two "Sea King" helicopters. These helicopters are equipped with machine-guns, to be used against alleged piracy infrastructures, in line with the EU's decision. "Particularly the Bundeswehr, at this point" can launch these attacks, writes the press, "because it has the appropriate helicopters in the theater of operations."

Very Experienced in Surveillance

SWP is now proposing another militarization project for the Horn of Africa and calls on the German government to dispatch German submarines to the Somali coast. The crews of the submarines are "familiar with deployment in shallow waters and reconnaissance missions." Thanks to their "highly modern sensor technology," the submarines are not only capable of "keeping potential pirate bases under surveillance day and night with great perseverance (...) and rapidly signaling the surveillance results." They are also capable of localizing pirate vessels and following their course. Other warships, or their board helicopters, could open fire, if Berlin still seeks to avoid the deployment of special forces. The current official EU position does not permit ground troops to engage the pirates on shore. The SWP author, who, during his career in the Navy had served as a submarine commander as well as a fleet command operations officer, points out that submarines, unlike helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft, can operate "undercover" - they are undetectable by the pirates. The German Navy has extensive experience. "For years it has been participating in NATO's undercover surveillance operations in the Mediterranean."

Geostrategic Competition

These militarization plans are certainly not a reaction merely to considerations of how to combat more effectively piracy off the coast of Somalia, but to geostrategic considerations as well. For example, last year Volker Perthes, Director of SWP, pointed out that the "interests" behind the countries' sending their naval vessels to the Horn of Africa are not "limited to the war on piracy." Perthes explains that, over the past few years, the importance of the Indian Ocean, where piracy is being fought in its western sector, has enormously grown. "One third of the world's maritime trade" crosses this route, with the trend rising rapidly. Particularly East Asian countries, especially China, are making large infrastructure investments in the bordering countries - port facilities or transportation means -, which are "also elements of the geostrategic competition." It is, after all, "it goes without saying" that China and even India have "an interest in protecting their maritime links." Even though the United States "will remain the strongest maritime power in the Indian Ocean, for the foreseeable future," it will soon "no longer be the sole maritime power." Perthes warns that "the new momentum in the greater region of the Indian Ocean" should not be neglected and one must also be involved.

The Decisive Maritime Region

Parting from this premise, military experts are emphasizing the need for the strongest possible naval presence in the Indian Ocean. "With the growing geostrategic significance of the Indian Ocean region, the influence also grows for those, participating in the political military architecture of the region," according to a military policy analysis published last year in a renowned Austrian military review. "A gigantic power struggle is currently taking place in the Indian Ocean," a high-ranking Swiss officer is quoted saying. "The navies of China, Japan, India, the USA, the Europeans, the NATO, and the EU are taking up positions, ports are being built, and naval forces are being equipped." The officer sees world historical upheavals. "For the first time since the 16th Century," he writes, "we are seeing the downfall of a western maritime power in this decisive maritime region."The military activities in the Indian Ocean, even at the Horn of Africa, will determine who, in the future, will predominate over an ocean, characterized by the former director of the German Combined Chief of Staff in the Defense Ministry, ret. Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser as the "decisive region for the seas of the world" and characterized it as "decisive for the future power structure in Asia." (german-foreign-policy.com reported. This is the context, to be considered, if one wants to take up the proposal to station German submarines in the western sector of the Indian Ocean.

From www.german-foreign-policy.com

Russia Planning Troops Deployment On Iran's Northern Border And Waiting For A Western Attack By F. Michael Maloof

"Information Clearing House" --- WASHINGTON – The Russian military anticipates that an attack will occur on Iran by the summer and has developed an action plan to move Russian troops through neighboring Georgia to stage in Armenia, which borders on the Islamic republic, according to informed Russian sources.

Russian Security Council head Viktor Ozerov said that Russian General Military Headquarters has prepared an action plan in the event of an attack on Iran.

Dmitry Rogozin, who recently was the Russian ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, warned against an attack on Iran.

"Iran is our neighbor," Rogozin said. "If Iran is involved in any military action, it's a direct threat to our security." Rogozin now is the deputy Russian prime minister and is regarded as anti-Western. He oversees Russia's defense sector.

Russian Defense Ministry sources say that the Russian military doesn't believe that Israel has sufficient military assets to defeat Iranian defenses and further believes that U.S. military action will be necessary.

The implication of preparing to move Russian troops not only is to protect its own vital regional interests but possibly to assist Iran in the event of such an attack. Sources add that a Russian military buildup in the region could result in the Russian military potentially engaging Israeli forces, U.S. forces, or both.

Informed sources say that the Russians have warned of "unpredictable consequences" in the event Iran is attacked, with some Russians saying that the Russian military will take part in the possible war because it would threaten its vital interests in the region.

The influential Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper has quoted a Russian military source as saying that the situation forming around Syria and Iran "causes Russia to expedite the course of improvement of its military groups in the South Caucasus, the Caspian, Mediterranean and Black Sea regions."

This latest information comes from a series of reports and leaks from official Russian spokesmen and government news agencies who say that an Israeli attack is all but certain by the summer.

Because of the impact on Russian vital interests in the region, sources say that Russian preparations for such an attack began two years ago when Russian Military Base 102 in Gyumri, Armenia, was modernized. It is said to occupy a major geopolitical position in the region.

Families of Russian servicemen from the Russian base at Gyumri in Armenia close to the borders of Georgia and Turkey already have been evacuated, Russian sources say.

"Military Base 102 is a key point, Russia's outpost in the South Caucasus," a Russian military source told the newspaper. "It occupies a very important geopolitical position, but the Kremlin fears lest it should lose this situation."

With Vladimir Putin returning to the Russian presidency, the prospect that he again would order an attack on Georgia as he did in August 2008 also has become a possibility, these informed sources say.

The Russians believe that Georgia would cooperate with the United States in blocking any supplies from reaching Military Base 102, which now is supplied primarily by air. Right now, Georgia blocks the only land transportation route through which Russian military supplies could travel.

Fuel for the Russian base in Armenia comes from Iran. Russian officials believe this border crossing may be closed in the event of a war.

"Possibly, it will be necessary to use military means to breach the Georgian transport blockade and establish transport corridors leading into Armenia," according to Yury Netkachev, former deputy commander of Russian forces in Transcaucasia. Geography of the region suggests that any such supply corridor would have to go through the middle of Georgia approaching Georgia's capital of Tbilisi given the roads and topography of the country.

In September, the Russian military plans to hold its annual military exercises called Kavkaz 2012. However, informed Russian sources say that preparations and deployments of military equipment and personnel already have begun in anticipation of a possible war with Iran.

These sources report that new command and control equipment has been deployed in the region capable of using the Russian GPS system, GLONASS for targeting information.

"The air force in the South Military District is reported to have been rearmed almost 100 percent with new jets and helicopters," according to regional expert Pavel Felgenhauer of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation.

In 2008, Felgenhauer pointed out, Kavkaz 2008 maneuvers allowed the Russian military to covertly deploy forces that successfully invaded Georgia in August of that year.

Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov already has announced that new Spetznaz, or Special Forces units, will be deployed in Stavropol and Kislovodsk, which are located in the North Caucasian regions.

Russian sources say that the Russian military believes that if the U.S. goes to war with Iran, it may deploy forces into Georgia and warships in the Caspian Sea with the possible help of Azerbaijan, which since has stated that it will not allow its territory to be used by Israel to launch an attack on neighboring Iran.

There had been speculation that given the improved relations between Israel and Azerbaijan, the Jewish state may use bases from which to launch air attacks on neighboring Iran's nuclear sites. Israel recently agreed to sell Azerbaijan $1.6 billion in military equipment.

A further irritant to Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili is the prospect that Russian assault airborne troops, or VDV units, with helicopters could be moved into Georgia's two breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These two provinces were taken by the Russian military during the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Initially they were declared by Moscow to be independent countries, but now the Kremlin is indicating they may be annexed to Russia.

Similarly, Lt. General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the VDV, has announced that Russian troops in Armenia will be reinforced by paratroopers, along with attack and transport helicopters.

"The Russian spearhead (from the Transcaucasia region) may be ordered to strike south to prevent the presumed deployment of U.S. bases in Transcaucasia, to link up with the troops in Armenia and take over the South Caucasus energy corridor along which Azeri, Turkmen and other Caspian natural gas and oil may reach European markets," Felgenhauer said.

"By one swift military strike, Russia may ensure control of all the Caucasus and the Caspian states that were its former realm, establishing a fiat accompli the West, too preoccupied with Iran, would not reverse," he said.

"At the same time, a small victorious war would unite the Russian nation behind the Kremlin, allowing it to crush the remnants of the prodemocracy movement 'for fair elections,' and as a final bonus, Russia's military action could perhaps finally destroy the Saakashvili regime."

Putin has made no secret that he despises Saakashvili and with his return to the presidency, he may consider taking out the Georgian president as unfinished business. Just as in 2008, Putin will not have much to worry about if he sends Russian troops into Georgia, since there was muted reaction from the U.S. and the European countries to the Russian invasion and subsequent occupation.

F. Michael Maloof, staff writer for WND’s G2Bulletin, is a former senior security policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He can be contacted at mmaloof@wnd.com.
This post originally appeared at G2 Bulletin.

US Gives Iran 'Last Chance' Warning by Guy Adams

"The Independent" -Iran must immediately close a large nuclear facility built underneath a mountain if it is to take what President Obama has called a "last chance" to resolve its escalating dispute with the West via diplomacy.

Other "near term" concessions which must be met in the early stages of talks to avoid a potential military conflict, include the suspension of higher level uranium enrichment, and the surrender by Tehran of existing stockpiles of the fuel, senior US officials said yesterday.

Iran Warns West Against Military Intervention in Syria

A senior Iranian cleric warned the West and Saudi Arabia on Friday against taking military action in the Syrian crisis.

Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami said that the West, “the Arab hardliner regimes, and the Saudi Arabian government, all should know that if they intervene militarily in Syria, a fire would be started that would burn themselves before anyone else.”

The ayatollah’s comments come at a time of escalated violence in Syria, which is Iran’s most important regional ally. This week, Syrian forces have intensified attacks against opposition just days before an internationally sponsored ceasefire is set to take hold. This crackdown has prompted thousands of Syrian refugees to flee into Turkey in recent days.

Iran fears that the upheaval in Syria provides the West and Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to sever Tehran’s critical alliance with Damascus.

The Trumpet believes that, as international pressure against the Syrian government continues to mount, Iranian fears will be realized. A split between Iran and Syria is on the horizon.
From thetrumpet.com

EU Militaries Pool Resources, Reduce Dependence on America

EU defense ministers attend a Defense Ministers Council on March 22, at EU headquarters in Brussels.
(Georges Gobet/AFP/Getty Images)

From Thetrumpet.com

EU nations will invest in joint military projects such as air-to-air refueling and field hospitals as they try to save money and reduce their dependence on the United States, defense ministers from across the European Union decided March 22.

Meeting as part of the European Defense Agency’s Steering Board, they signed declarations of intent in these areas and said they would increase cooperation in procurement and research.

“The EU-led nato operation in Libya last year also exposed hardware and technology deficiencies in the EU military,” wrote the EU Observer.

“Gaps in the EU military were already identified in Afghanistan,” it writes. “The former U.S. defense minister Robert Gates last year said Europe’s lack of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets rendered even Europe’s most advanced jet fighters useless. In Libya, the U.S. was also instrumental in air-to-air refueling.”

Hence the EU’s decision to develop air-to-air refueling as “a matter of priority,” as the European Defense Agency’s press release says. It is also working to fix its shortcomings in other areas.

The United States is encouraging Europe to become more militarily independent, as it focuses its attention more on the Pacific.

European militaries have a lot to gain from working together. Combined, they have a military budget second only to the U.S. They have the potential to be a major military power if they work together.

Many EU nations want to go much further toward a common military. “The UK is reluctant to go ahead with this, but everybody else wants to, so we should move forward,” said Finland’s Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja earlier in the month (March 9).

As Britain becomes increasingly sidelined, expect EU nations to integrate their militaries much more. Watch for them to continue to overcome their weaknesses—with American encouragement—so they are less reliant on the U.S. This is something America will deeply regret, however. For more on the agenda behind Europe’s military desires, read Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry’s article “The Holy Roman Empire Is Back!”

JOHN MACDOUGALL/AFP/Getty Images

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L), German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (C) and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski in Berlin on March 21

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski visited Berlin on March 21 to meet informally with German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The visit, while part of a cooperation and discussions framework, underscores Poland's sensitive position at the center of rising tensions between Russia and NATO over missile defense. Warsaw finds its national security very concretely threatened by the missiles system that Russia reactivated in Kaliningrad and is set to step up its search for supplemental and alternative regional security arrangements.

Analysis

The March 21 meeting marked the second annual reunion of the discussion and cooperation group formed by the foreign ministries of Russia, Germany and Poland in May 2011. Russia pushed for this cooperation format as a counterweight to the "Weimar Triangle" arrangement, which is composed of France, Poland and Germany.
Russia is at a critical juncture in its resurgence. Moscow hopes to take advantage of the economic crisis roiling the Continent to bolster its own efforts to re-establish its control in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia's former area of influence. NATO's level of engagement in Central and Eastern Europe is as low as it has been since the end of the Cold War. But Moscow still faces a critical hurdle regarding the continued implementation of the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Central European countries, which it sees as a strategic threat.
The Kremlin has continued to push back against the BMD deployment. Moscow most recently escalated tensions by reactivating the S-400 missile defense system in its Kaliningrad exclave and has threatened to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad before the end of the year.
Moscow's attempts to gain negotiating leverage with Washington over the BMD present Poland with an untenable strategic threat: the potential to have Russian short-range ballistic missiles placed along its northern border. Vladimir Putin's re-election to Russia's presidency and his assertive foreign policy rhetoric during the electoral campaign will do little to allay Polish concerns. But Warsaw has a limited hand to play.
The U.S. position on BMD has generated a military buildup and more aggressive rhetoric from Russia, leaving Poland with few realistic options to counter the threat to its national security. This general security imbalance is not new to Warsaw -- it has long known that Russia was on the rise again, that NATO was growing increasingly disengaged in Central Europe, and that the European Union has continued to struggle with its own political and economic crisis, which makes it unlikely to ever become a satisfactory guarantor of security.

In response to these security concerns, Poland has sought to form regional strategic and military cooperation groups within larger EU and NATO structures. The creation of the Visegrad Group in July 2011, under the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, was one such effort. Poland has also recently been looking to establish greater security cooperation in the Baltic region, particularly with Lithuania, with which Warsaw recently agreed to coordinate positions on NATO's missile defense plans in Europe.

However, such plans are in their nascent stages and have so far proved to have little effectiveness. Poland's limited success in this arena is partly due to its focus on issues other than the strategic counterbalance of Russia. Warsaw has concentrated most of its diplomatic efforts on the West -- the source of Poland's continued economic prosperity even amid the crisis -- and on seeking a greater role within the changing EU architecture. In late 2011, Sikorski himself said he saw the collapse of the European Union as Poland's primary existential threat and even called for increased German leadership within the union.

Stratfor expects the recent military buildup in Kaliningrad to remind Poland of its dearth of security options regarding Russia. While any concrete reaction by Warsaw is unlikely, countering the Russian threat will certainly move to the forefront of Polish foreign policy. Poland will intensify its efforts to craft regional strategic and military counterweights, seeking further commitments within and outside NATO and EU structures, though this will not likely achieve Poland's security goals concerning Russia in the short term.

The Tuaregs: From African Nomads to Smugglers and Mercenaries

The Tuaregs, a nomadic tribe in North and West Africa, dominated the caravan trade through the Sahara Desert for thousands of years. Their entire way of life was disrupted, however, by the imposition of borders, natural desertification, urbanization and the rise of maritime trade. In their quest to survive, the Tuaregs have launched several revolts in Mali and Niger, fought as mercenaries in the Libyan civil war and used their expertise to smuggle illicit goods, which brought them into contact with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It is the development of these skills and links to AQIM that have brought the Tuaregs to Western governments' attention.

Analysis

In late August 2011, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, a Tuareg rebel who led an uprising in Mali in 2007-2009 before fleeing to Libya, re-emerged in northern Mali. He conducted an interview via satellite phone Aug. 26 with Algerian newspaper Al Watan during which he vowed to renew the Tuareg rebellion. Within hours of the interview, Ag Bahanga was killed in a car crash in Mali's Kidal region -- an event that was probably not an accident.
Ag Bahanga was among an estimated 800 Tuaregs who fought as mercenaries in the Libyan civil war and had begun returning home in late 2011 as the conflict drew to a close. The Tuaregs' native countries, particularly Mali and Niger, had endured a number of Tuareg uprisings over the past several decades, so they were rightfully concerned about the arrival of hundreds of trained and equipped fighters. Ag Bahanga was designated "enemy No. 1" by the U.S.-trained Malian counterterrorism unit tasked with combating the Tuareg rebellion.
The returning Tuareg fighters are more than just rebels and mercenaries, however. They have also taken up weapon, drug and hostage smuggling in a region with which they are intimately familiar, and they have been accused of having links to AQIM. Their knowledge of the terrain, history of militancy and smuggling, and links to an al Qaeda franchise group have brought the Tuaregs to the attention of Western governments, which are concerned that the Tuaregs could become a source of manpower for transnational terrorism.

The United States in Korea: A Strategy of Inertia

By George Friedman

After U.S. President Barack Obama visited the Korean Demilitarized Zone on March 25 during his trip to South Korea for a nuclear security summit, he made the obligatory presidential remarks warning North Korea against continued provocations. He also praised the strength of U.S.-South Korean relations and commended the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there. Obama's visit itself is of little importance, but it is an opportunity to ask just what Washington's strategy is in Korea and how the countries around North Korea (China, Russia, South Korea and Japan) view the region. As always, any understanding of current strategy requires a consideration of the history of that strategy.

The Korean War and the U.S. Proto-Strategy

Korea became a key part of U.S. Cold War-era containment strategy almost by accident. Washington, having deployed forces in China during World War II and thus aware of the demographic and geographic problems of operating on the Asian mainland, envisioned a maritime strategy based on the island chains running from the Aleutians to Java. The Americans would use the islands and the 7th Fleet to contain both the Soviets and the Chinese on the mainland.
Korea conceptually lay outside this framework. The peninsula was not regarded by the United States as central to its strategy even after the victory of the communists in the Chinese civil war. After World War II, the Korean Peninsula, which had been occupied by the Japanese since the early 1900s, was divided into two zones. The North came under the control of communists, the South under the control of a pro-American regime. Soviet troops withdrew from the North in 1948 and U.S. troops pulled out of the South the following year, despite some calls to keep them in place to dissuade communist aggression. The actual U.S. policy toward an invasion of the South by the North is still being debated, but a U.S. intervention on the Korean Peninsula clearly violated Washington's core strategic principle of avoiding mainland operations and maintaining a strategic naval blockade.

U.S. strategy changed in 1950, when the North Koreans invaded the South, sparking the Korean War. Pyongyang's motives remain unclear, as do the roles of Moscow and Beijing in the decision. Obviously, Pyongyang wanted to unite the peninsula under communist control, and obviously, it did not carry out its invasion against Chinese and Russian wishes, but it appears all involved estimated the operation was within the capabilities of the North Korean army. Had the North Korean military faced only South Korean forces, they would have been right. They clearly miscalculated the American intent to intervene, though it is not clear that even the Americans understood their intent prior to the intervention. However, once the North Koreans moved south, President Harry Truman decided to intervene. His reasoning had less to do with Korea than with the impact of a communist military success on coalition partners elsewhere. The U.S. global strategy depended on Washington's ability to convince its partners that it would come to their aid if they were invaded. Strategic considerations aside, not intervening would have created a crisis of confidence, or so was the concern. Therefore, the United States intervened.

After serious difficulties, the United States managed to push the North Korean forces back into the North and pursue them almost to the Yalu River, which divides Korea and China. This forced a strategic decision on China. The Chinese were unclear on the American intent but did not underestimate American power. North Korea had represented a buffer between U.S. allies and northeastern China (and a similar buffer for the Soviets to protect their maritime territories). The Chinese intervened in the war, pushing the Americans back from the Yalu and suffering huge casualties in the process. The Americans regrouped, pushed back and a stalemate was achieved roughly along the former border and the current Demilitarized Zone. The truce was negotiated and the United States left forces in Korea, the successors of which President Obama addressed during his visit.

Gunman dead as French siege ends

A police siege in the French city of Toulouse has ended with a man suspected of killing seven people now dead, the French interior minister has said.

Police stormed the flat where Mohammed Merah was holed up at 09:30 GMT, after a siege that had lasted 32 hours.
Merah fired at officers and was found dead after jumping from a window.
The self-confessed al-Qaeda militant was suspected of killing four people outside a Jewish school and three soldiers in three separate attacks.
Merah, 23, said he was acting to "avenge Palestinian children" and protest against French military interventions overseas.
President Nicolas Sarkozy, in a televised address, said everything had been done to try to bring Merah to justice but it was decided that no more lives could be put at risk.
He also vowed a new crackdown on those who visited "hate or terrorism" web sites or travelled abroad to be indoctrinated in terrorism.

Interior Minister Claude Gueant said officers had thrown grenades and entered by the door and windows of the flat.After surveying the scene and finding no sign of the suspect, they proceeded to the bathroom, moving slowly as they were wary of booby-traps.
When officers tried to find out if there was anyone in the bathroom, the suspect came out firing several weapons.
Mr Gueant said the suspect was "shooting very violently. The bursts of gunfire were frequent and hard".
Merah then jumped from a window, continuing to fire. He was found dead on the ground.
One police source told Agence France-Presse that Merah had been killed by police as he fled through the window.
Two officers were reported wounded in the final assault.
Mr Gueant said: "A RAID [special police] officer who is used to this kind of thing told me that he had never seen such a violent assault."
Earlier Mr Gueant had said it was unclear whether Merah was still alive, because there had been no contact overnight.
He had said the object had been to take Merah alive.
A number of explosions had been set off overnight to intimidate Merah, officials said.
They said he was armed with a Kalashnikov high-velocity rifle, a mini-Uzi 9mm machine pistol, several handguns and possibly grenades.
Street lights were switched off in the vicinity of the building on Wednesday evening and surrounding areas evacuated.n his TV address, Mr Sarkozy announced an investigation into whether Merah had accomplices and into possible Islamist indoctrination practices in prisons.
He also said: "The French should not give rein to anger - our Muslim compatriots have nothing to do with the crazy actions of a terrorist. We should not embark on any stigmatisation."
Merah claimed to have received al-Qaeda training in Pakistan's Waziristan area, and also said he had been to Afghanistan.
Mr Gueant defended intelligence services for not preventing the attacks, describing Merah as a "lone wolf".
"The domestic intelligence agency tracks a lot of people who are involved in Islamist radicalism. Expressing ideas... is not enough to bring someone before justice," Mr Gueant said.
Christian Etelin, a lawyer who has previously acted for Merah, said his client had violent tendencies.
"There was his religious engagement, an increasing hatred against the values of a democratic society and a desire to impose what he believes is truth," Mr Etelin said.

He also denied earlier reports that Merah had been jailed for explosives offensives in Afghanistan, saying his client was in jail in France for robbery with violence at the time - from December 2007 to September 2009.

Germany Hasn’t Given Up on a United States of Europe

From theTrumpet.com

Led by Berlin, a select group of 10 states has formed to ‘revive the ideal of a united Europe.’

The name “Berlin Club” evokes images of a secretive organization, one in which wealthy old aristocrats gather together to drink scotch and plot to conquer the world.

By Brad MacDonald

Time will tell, but that impression might not be too far from reality.

Created and led by Germany, the “Berlin Club” met for the first time on March 20 in Berlin. There’s a lot we haven’t been told about Europe’s latest club of elitists. What we do know is that it’s the brainchild of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, that it is comprised of Europe’s most pro-unification states, and that it exists to reinvigorate the unification of Europe.

Germany is joined in the club by Poland, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Luxemburg, Spain, Denmark and France. The select group is scheduled to meet at least four more times to discuss proposals for closer integration, and plans to publish its conclusions in a final report. The club’s agenda is long, and includes discussions about European security and border control, fiscal and economic government, and ways to stabilize growth.

Yesterday, Presseurop translated an article from the Spanish abc newspaper reporting that “10 countries have formed the ‘Berlin Club’ to revive the European project.” According to the abc article, Berlin’s goal is to “create a kind of ‘club’ committed to developing formulas that, in these times of crisis, will revive the ideal of a united Europe” (emphasis added throughout). Since Europe’s financial crisis began in 2008, the EU has been hit with one crisis after another, with each being reported by many as another nail in the coffin of a United States of Europe.

Clearly Germany hasn’t got the memo, and isn’t prepared to give up on unification just yet.

In a separate but apparently related development, Westerwelle stated in a March 9 meeting with EU foreign ministers that the EU needs a new constitution. “I think we have to reopen the debate about a European constitution again,” he said. “We have a good treaty, but we need a constitution … as there are new centers of power in the world.” Many EU states disagreed with the German foreign minister. But not all.

Following Westerwelle’s statement, Reuters reported March 10 that nine EU nations had agreed to gather in Berlin on March 20 to discuss creating a new EU constitution. While the leaders involved have been characteristically vague, it appears Tuesday’s (March 20) meeting in Berlin about a new constitution was in fact the same one the abc article identified as the first gathering of the “Berlin Club.”

If so, then it appears the first priority of the 10-member German-led Berlin Club is the creation of a new European constitution.

So much for the opinions of the EU’s other 17 member states.

So much for European integration being a collaborative process that involves consensus, compromise and transparency.

So much for democracy!

It seems Germany, together with nine or ten other states loyal to the supreme goal of unification, is determined to make the dream of a United States of Europe a reality. It won’t be easy; as Europe’s financial crisis is making clear, the process will be fraught with hurdles and challenges. But Germany and a few select allies are not yet ready to abandon European unification.

Bible prophecy demands we watch Germany, and especially the “Berlin Club,” closely. In Mystery of the Ages, the late Herbert Armstrong explained how the prophecies in Revelation 13 and 17 foretell the resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire. He wrote, “… Daniel 7, and Revelation 13 and 17, is referring to the new United States of Europe that is now forming, out of the European Common Market, before your very eyes!”

Notice what Mr. Armstrong forecast next: “Revelation 17:12 makes plain the detail that it shall be a union of 10 kings or kingdoms that (Revelation 17:8) shall resurrect the old Roman Empire.”

The Trumpet has continued Mr. Armstrong’s forecast and explained repeatedly that a closely integrated group of 10 nations, or groups of nations, would emerge out of the 27-member EU behemoth that exists today. We don’t know for certain if the Berlin Club constitutes this group, but it’s absolutely possible. The formation of the Berlin Club does, however, prove that certain European elites know that the only way to European unification is if select states unite behind Germany to form a devoted, streamlined core.

Among the many details given in Revelation 17 about the now-forming resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire, it identifies this core bloc as being comprised of “ten kings.” Mr. Armstrong believed it was possible that the 10 nations or kingdoms that would comprise this combine might even be ruled over by 10 literal kings, coming from the various monarchies of Europe. If this is the case, then we should expect to see a renaissance of royal leadership in Europe.

With this in mind, it’s interesting to consider recent remarks by Germany’s Prince Philip Kiril of Prussia, a great-great-grandson of Germany’s last kaiser. Speaking to Germany’s Die Zeit newspaper last Thursday, Prince Phillip called for the reinstatement of a king in Germany. Reinstituting the monarchy in Germany, he explained, would help unite the nation, boost confidence and pride and speak to people’s emotions.

It’s difficult to predict precisely how these developments will play out. But while there’s uncertainty surrounding the details, there’s little doubt about the broader trends in Europe. First, it’s now patently obvious that Europe’s financial crisis has thrust Germany forward as the unchecked financial and political authority in Europe. Second, it’s clear that every European country serious about unification has fallen in line behind German leadership.

Finally, despite Europe’s perilous financial state and the immense political uncertainty, the creation of ventures like the Berlin Club prove that Germany and a few select allies have not abandoned the dream of creating a United States of Europe! •

The Arabian Peninsula has not been immune to the wave of recent demonstrations in countries across the Middle East. Notably, protests have been ongoing in Saudi Arabia's Shiite-concentrated Eastern Province for more than a year. Recently, however, unrelated demonstrations began in parts of the country where such unrest is rare, including a March 19 protest by female students demanding changes in university regulations and an improved infrastructure and academic environment at the Women's College of Art campuses in Asir province and Qassim province.
Historically, the Saudi monarchy has employed a series of tactics and sophisticated religious and tribal networks of influence to shut down -- or at least maintain control over -- the relatively few demonstrations that have developed outside the Shiite-majority region. But the new, Sunni-led protests are primarily youth-driven and supported by modern tools such as the Internet -- factors that could erode the monarchy's reliable methods of dissent suppression and potentially lead to an unprecedented escalation of demonstrations.

Analysis

The protest that sparked the recent string of demonstrations in Saudi Arabia began March 7 at an all-female campus of King Khalid University in Asir province. Hundreds of students reportedly protested against discrimination and mismanagement at the university before security forces dispersed the crowd with batons, injuring dozens. The incident reportedly spurred similar gatherings by both men and women in solidarity with the King Khalid University students -- as well as in demand for better facilities -- at several other universities across Saudi Arabia, including in Riyadh. According to social media and news reports, additional demonstrations are planned for the coming weeks.
Protests are banned in Saudi Arabia, making the recent events quite anomalous. Thus far, the demonstrations outside Eastern Province have not called for political reform or involved slogans expressing grievances against the government. The demonstrations could cease to gain traction, or be satisfied with minor concessions and die out. However, small human rights protests often lead to larger demands for political change.
There are several key differences between the protests in Eastern Province and those in other parts of the country. Since February 2011, eastern Shiite demonstrators have demanded political reforms, the release of political prisoners and increased recognition of human rights. In contrast, the recent protests outside Eastern Province are Sunni-led and have called primarily for better university facilities. The demonstrators have not yet called for political reforms, which could threaten the Saudi government.

Suppression and Stability Strategies

The Saudi royals fear that a nascent reformist faction will gain traction due to the rise of political Islamists elsewhere in the Arab world. These concerns are growing at a time when the Saudi rulers are also facing upcoming challenges in the royal family succession. At this point, the demonstrations do not pose a serious threat to the stability of the monarchy, and the royals still have a number of well-established mechanisms to contain the dissent.
The monarchy maintains a tight security apparatus, which can be quickly dispatched to break up demonstrations. However, unlike other regimes, Saudi authorities avoid using brute force against protesters. Instead, to maintain their hegemony and social stability, the Saudi authorities isolate instigators from wider society (often through a series of arrests) and seek to use their entrenched influence among the Saudi tribal and religious networks to quell public dissent before it spreads.
To keep the population and local leaders happy, the monarchy provides a combination of cash handouts, subsidies and benefits. It also regularly marries into and develops relationships with nearly every tribe and province. And it cultivates varying degrees of influence in the country's ulema, or religious networks, by instilling fear of religious condemnation and arrests into both religious leaders and the general population. This nexus between local and religious leadership and the al-Saud family provides the monarchy networks that can be wielded to exert influence among a wide array of Saudi citizens. The networks also help perpetuate a norm among Saudis that public dissent, especially protests, is a taboo Western tactic and is fundamentally un-Islamic.

Cultural Shifts and Challenges

It is important to watch for signs of erosion of this norm, which is a possibility considering that the demonstrations have occurred primarily among Saudi youth, who might not be as influenced by the hierarchies of Saudi tribes and families. In addition, the youth have access to previously unavailable tools, such as the Internet, which is used by some to discuss current circumstances and continue to explore ideas even when demonstrations are shut down. The frequency and growing geographical diversity of the protests suggests the monarchy cannot rely on Saudi norms and networks to pacify dissent.
If demonstrations strengthen and become more political, authorities might decide that stronger suppression tactics, similar to those employed to manage the simmering unrest in the Eastern Province, are necessary. Indeed, tactics such as arrests, a heavier security presence, the use of rubber bullets and tear gas, and controlling the clerics through ulema networks have allowed authorities to largely contain the demonstrations and prevent them from undermining governance and the economy in the Eastern Province. If the new protests escalate, how the demonstrators respond to the government's tactics -- and whether the spirit of protest endure -- will be increasingly important to observe.
Stratfor.com

Mali: Soldiers Reportedly Seize Power In Coup

Soldiers seized power in a coup in Bamako on March 22 and deposed President Amadou Toumani Toure, The Guardian reported. The mutineers, calling themselves the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR) said they suspended the constitution and dissolved institutions. Leader Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo announced a curfew on state television. CNRDR spokesman Amadou Konare said the group will hand power back to an elected president after the country is unified and safe. An opposition leader said Toure was not in the presidential palace and the soldiers appear to have taken him to another location.

From stratfor.com

Russia's Energy Plans for Turkey

Russia is interested in building natural gas storage facilities in Turkey, officials from Russia's Gazprom said March 20. Over the winter, Gazprom redirected natural gas from its storage facilities in Europe after a spike in demand in Turkey. Now, Gazprom wants to build underground natural gas storage facilities in Turkey to help when supplies dwindle in the future.
Gazprom's proposal is part of Russia's larger strategy -- in both Turkey and Europe -- to increase Moscow's energy leverage with its customers. Although Ankara will be wary of giving Moscow more influence in Turkey, there is little it can do at the moment to withstand the Kremlin's strategy.

Analysis

Energy is one of the cornerstones of the Russo-Turkish relationship. Russia provides approximately 58 percent of Turkey's natural gas supplies, making it Turkey's largest natural gas supplier. Ankara has long sought ways to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas, since Moscow traditionally uses its energy supplies as political leverage with many of its customers. For its part, Russia wants to keep Turkey tied to it through energy and to prevent other suppliers from helping Ankara diversify its natural gas sources. Thus, Russia wants to increase its leverage in its energy relationship with Turkey.
Russia is working on a complex strategy to strengthen its position relative to its Western energy customers, particularly in Europe. The first element of the strategy is to move Russia away from its primary role of natural gas supplier and increase its ownership of other natural gas-related assets. The second element is to lock many of Moscow's customers into 10-to-15-year contracts, which Russia has made more appealing by offering natural gas at a discount.
Russia is in negotiations to purchase electricity networks in Germany, natural gas distribution networks in Greece, and electricity and distribution networks in Italy. Moscow has also shown interest in the natural gas distribution networks in the Czech Republic. Russia has struck tentative deals with Germany, Italy and others on 10-year contracts with natural gas price discounts of between 10 and 30 percent. Amid Europe's financial difficulties, the discounts are welcomed. Russia knows that many long-term energy diversity programs are under way in Europe and so is trying to prepare for when those become operational by striking long-term deals.
This European strategy appears to be expanding into Turkey with Gazprom's announcement of interest in building natural gas storage facilities there. Turkey is already on Gazprom's list of countries that could take part in renegotiations on natural gas price contracts, according to Stratfor sources. Russia and Turkey's contract on supplies sent via the Blue Stream pipeline is set to expire in 2013, though the contract on Russian supplies that transit Bulgaria has many years left. Turkey could enter into larger negotiations, like the Europeans, and receive a discount of 10 percent or more. The problem is that Russia will insist on a long-term contract, likely spanning at least 10 years, and Turkey will resist such a deal because it anticipates an increase of natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz II project in approximately 5 years.
In the short term, however, the possibility of cheaper natural gas and Russia's constructing natural gas storage in Turkey are attractive ideas. Russia's offer comes as Turkey is in a pricing dispute with its second-largest natural gas provider, Iran. Turkey currently pays Iran $505 per thousand cubic meters (mcm) of natural gas -- a steep price compared to the $400 per mcm it pays Russia. Turkey also regularly experiences reliability problems with supplies from Iran, especially in the winter. While Ankara has been careful to maintain a working relationship with Tehran to help Iran circumvent sanctions, Turkey also would likely be interested in more security if more problems arose with Iranian supplies, particularly amid increasing sanctions on Iran from the United States and Europe.
Moscow would be more inclined to provide a greater discount on natural gas supplies to Ankara if the negotiations included Russia gaining assets in Turkey, as it would if it built natural gas storage facilities there. Such facilities could relieve the stress on Turkey's supplies should issues with Iran grow more problematic. Cheaper natural gas and more secure supplies from Russia make Moscow's offer attractive to Ankara. However, either agreement would give Russia greater leverage in Turkey, since Russia would own assets in the country and Turkey would be locked into a long-term contract.
Ankara could want to diversify its natural gas supplies away from Russia and prevent Moscow from gaining more energy -- and ultimately political -- leverage in Turkey. But Ankara has little recourse against Russia's strategy right now. New natural gas supply options -- increased supplies from Iran, the Azerbaijani expansion of Shah Deniz II or liquefied natural gas alternatives -- are years away, and problems with Iran are jeopardizing Turkey's current supplies. Russia might be the only option Turkey has in the short term.

How Myanmar Liberates Asia by Robert D. Kaplan

Myanmar's ongoing liberalization and its normalization of relations with the outside world have the possibility of profoundly affecting geopolitics in Asia -- and all for the better.
Geographically, Myanmar dominates the Bay of Bengal. It is where the spheres of influence of China and India overlap. Myanmar is also abundant in oil, natural gas, coal, zinc, copper, precious stones, timber and hydropower, with some uranium deposits as well. The prize of the Indo-Pacific region, Myanmar has been locked up by dictatorship for decades, even as the Chinese have been slowly stripping it of natural resources. Think of Myanmar as another Afghanistan in terms of its potential to change a region: a key, geo-strategic puzzle piece ravaged by war and ineffective government that, if only normalized, would unroll trade routes in all directions.

The State of the World: Assessing China's StrategyThe State of the World: Assessing China's Strategy

By George Friedman
Simply put, China has three core strategic interests.
Paramount among them is the maintenance of domestic security. Historically, when China involves itself in global trade, as it did in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the coastal region prospers, while the interior of China -- which begins about 160 kilometers (100 miles) from the coast and runs about 1,600 kilometers to the west -- languishes. Roughly two-thirds of all Chinese citizens currently have household incomes lower than the average household income in Bolivia. Most of China's poor are located west of the richer coastal region. This disparity of wealth time and again has exposed tensions between the interests of the coast and those of the interior. After a failed rising in Shanghai in 1927, Mao Zedong exploited these tensions by undertaking the Long March into the interior, raising a peasant army and ultimately conquering the coastal region. He shut China off from the international trading system, leaving China more united and equal, but extremely poor.

The current government has sought a more wealth-friendly means of achieving stability: buying popular loyalty with mass employment. Plans for industrial expansion are implemented with little thought to markets or margins; instead, maximum employment is the driving goal. Private savings are harnessed to finance the industrial effort, leaving little domestic capital to purchase the output. China must export accordingly.
China's second strategic concern derives from the first. China's industrial base by design produces more than its domestic economy can consume, so China must export goods to the rest of the world while importing raw materials. The Chinese therefore must do everything possible to ensure international demand for their exports. This includes a range of activities, from investing money in the economies of consumer countries to establishing unfettered access to global sea-lanes.

The third strategic interest is in maintaining control over buffer states. The population of the historical Han Chinese heartland is clustered in the eastern third of the country, where ample precipitation distinguishes it from the much more dry and arid central and western thirds. China's physical security therefore depends on controlling the four non-Han Chinese buffer states that surround it: Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. Securing these regions means China can insulate itself from Russia to the north, any attack from the western steppes, and any attack from India or Southeast Asia.
Controlling the buffer states provides China geographical barriers -- jungles, mountains, steppes and the Siberian wasteland -- that are difficult to surmount and creates a defense in depth that puts any attacker at a grave disadvantage.

Challenged Interests

Today, China faces challenges to all three of these interests.
The economic downturn in Europe and the United States, China's two main customers, has exposed Chinese exports to increased competition and decreased appetite. Meanwhile, China has been unable to appropriately increase domestic demand and guarantee access to global sea-lanes independent of what the U.S. Navy is willing to allow.
Those same economic stresses also challenge China domestically. The wealthier coast depends on trade that is now faltering, and the impoverished interior requires subsidies that are difficult to provide when economic growth is slowing substantially.

In addition, two of China's buffer regions are in flux. Elements within Tibet and Xinjiang adamantly resist Han Chinese occupation. China understands that the loss of these regions could pose severe threats to China's security, particularly if such losses would draw India north of the Himalayas or create a radical Islamic regime in Xinjiang.
The situation in Tibet is potentially the most troubling. Outright war between India and China -- anything beyond minor skirmishes -- is impossible so long as both are separated by the Himalayas. Neither side could logistically sustain large-scale multi-divisional warfare in that terrain. But China and India could threaten one another if they were to cross the Himalayas and establish a military presence on the either side of the mountain chain. For India, the threat would emerge if Chinese forces entered Pakistan in large numbers. For China, the threat would occur if large numbers of Indian troops entered Tibet.

China therefore constantly postures as if it were going to send large numbers of forces into Pakistan, but in the end, the Pakistanis have no interest in de facto Chinese occupation -- even if the occupation were directed against India. Likewise, the Chinese are not interested in undertaking security operations in Pakistan. The Indians have little interest in sending forces into Tibet in the event of a Tibetan revolution. For India, an independent Tibet without Chinese forces would be interesting, but a Tibet where the Indians would have to commit significant forces would not be. As much as the Tibetans represent a problem for China, the problem is manageable. Tibetan insurgents might receive some minimal encouragement and support from India, but not to a degree that would threaten Chinese control.

So long as the internal problems in Han China are manageable, so is Chinese domination of the buffer states, albeit with some effort and some damage to China's reputation abroad.
The key for China is maintaining interior stability. If this portion of Han China destabilizes, control of the buffers becomes impossible. Maintaining interior stability requires the transfer of resources, which in turn requires the continued robust growth of the Chinese coastal economy to generate the capital to transfer inland. Should exports stop flowing out and raw materials in, incomes in the interior would quickly fall to politically explosive levels. (China today is far from revolution, but social tensions are increasing, and China must use its security apparatus and the People's Liberation Army to control these tensions.)
Maintaining those flows is a considerable challenge. The very model of employment and market share over profitability misallocates scores of resources and breaks the normally self-regulating link between supply and demand. One of the more disruptive results is inflation, which alternatively raises the costs of subsidizing the interior while eroding China's competitiveness with other low-cost global exporters.

For the Chinese, this represents a strategic challenge, a challenge that can only be countered by increasing the profitability on Chinese economic activity. This is nearly impossible for low value-added producers. The solution is to begin manufacturing higher value-added products (fewer shoes, more cars), but this necessitates a different sort of work force, one with years more education and training than the average Chinese coastal inhabitant, much less someone from the interior. It also requires direct competition with the well-established economies of Japan, Germany and the United States. This is the strategic battleground that China must attack if it is to maintain its stability.

A Military Component

Besides the issues with its economic model, China also faces a primarily military problem. China depends on the high seas to survive. The configuration of the South China Sea and the East China Sea render China relatively easy to blockade. The East China Sea is enclosed on a line from Korea to Japan to Taiwan, with a string of islands between Japan and Taiwan. The South China Sea is even more enclosed on a line from Taiwan to the Philippines, and from Indonesia to Singapore. Beijing's single greatest strategic concern is that the United States would impose a blockade on China, not by positioning its 7th Fleet inside the two island barriers but outside them. From there, the United States could compel China to send its naval forces far away from the mainland to force an opening -- and encounter U.S. warships -- and still be able to close off China's exits.

That China does not have a navy capable of challenging the United States compounds the problem. China is still in the process of completing its first aircraft carrier; indeed, its navy is insufficient in size and quality to challenge the United States. But naval hardware is not China's greatest challenge. The United States commissioned its first aircraft carrier in 1922 and has been refining both carrier aviation and battle group tactics ever since. Developing admirals and staffs capable of commanding carrier battle groups takes generations. Since the Chinese have never had a carrier battle group in the first place, they have never had an admiral commanding a carrier battle group.
China understands this problem and has chosen a different strategy to deter a U.S. naval blockade: anti-ship missiles capable of engaging and perhaps penetrating U.S. carrier defensive systems, along with a substantial submarine presence. The United States has no desire to engage the Chinese at all, but were this to change, the Chinese response would be fraught with difficulty.
While China has a robust land-based missile system, a land-based missile system is inherently vulnerable to strikes by cruise missiles, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles currently in development and other types of attack. China's ability to fight a sustained battle is limited. Moreover, a missile strategy works only with an effective reconnaissance capability. You cannot destroy a ship if you do not know where it is. This in turn necessitates space-based systems able to identify U.S. ships and a tightly integrated fire-control system. That raises the question of whether the United States has an anti-satellite capability. We would assume that it does, and if the United States used it, it would leave China blind.

China is therefore supplementing this strategy by acquiring port access in countries in the Indian Ocean and outside the South China Sea box. Beijing has plans to build ports in Myanmar, which is flirting with ending its international isolation, and Pakistan. Beijing already has financed and developed port access to Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and it has hopes for a deepwater port at Sittwe, Myanmar. In order for this strategy to work, China needs transportation infrastructure linking China to the ports. This means extensive rail and road systems. The difficulty of building this in Myanmar, for example, should not be underestimated.
But more important, China needs to maintain political relationships that will allow it to access the ports. Pakistan and Myanmar, for example, have a degree of instability, and China cannot assume that cooperative governments will always be in place in such countries. In Myanmar's case, recent political openings could result in Naypyidaw's falling out of China's sphere of influence. Building a port and roads and finding that a coup or an election has created an anti-Chinese government is a possibility. Given that this is one of China's fundamental strategic interests, Beijing cannot simply assume that building a port will give it unrestricted access to the port. Add to this that roads and rail lines are easily sabotaged by guerrilla forces or destroyed by air or missile attacks.

In order for the ports on the Indian Ocean to prove useful, Beijing must be confident in its ability to control the political situation in the host country for a long time. That sort of extended control can only be guaranteed by having overwhelming power available to force access to the ports and the transportation system. It is important to bear in mind that since the Communists took power, China has undertaken offensive military operations infrequently -- and to undesirable results. Its invasion of Tibet was successful, but it was met with minimal effective resistance. Its intervention in Korea did achieve a stalemate but at horrendous cost to the Chinese, who endured the losses but became very cautious in the future. In 1979, China attacked Vietnam but suffered a significant defeat. China has managed to project an image of itself as a competent military force, but in reality it has had little experience in force projection, and that experience has not been pleasant.

Internal Security vs. Power Projection

The reason for this inexperience stems from internal security. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is primarily configured as a domestic security force -- a necessity because of China's history of internal tensions. It is not a question of whether China is currently experiencing such tensions; it is a question of possibility. Prudent strategic planning requires building forces to deal with worst-case situations. Having been designed for internal security, the PLA is doctrinally and logistically disinclined toward offensive operations. Using a force trained for security as a force for offensive operations leads either to defeat or very painful stalemates. And given the size of China's potential internal issues and the challenge of occupying a country like Myanmar, let alone Pakistan, building a secondary force of sufficient capability might not outstrip China's available manpower but would certainly outstrip its command and logistical capabilities. The PLA was built to control China, not to project power outward, and strategies built around the potential need for power projection are risky at best. It should be noted that since the 1980s the Chinese have been attempting to transfer internal security responsibilities to the People's Armed Police, the border forces and other internal security forces that have been expanded and trained to deal with social instability. But despite this restructuring, there remain enormous limitations on China's ability to project military power on a scale sufficient to challenge the United States directly.

There is a disjuncture between the perception of China as a regional power and the reality. China can control its interior, but its ability to control its neighbors through military force is limited. Indeed, the fear of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is unfounded. It cannot mount an amphibious assault at that distance, let alone sustain extended combat logistically. One option China does have is surrogate guerrilla warfare in places like the Philippines or Indonesia. The problem with such warfare is that China needs to open sea-lanes, and guerrillas -- even guerrillas armed with anti-ship missiles or mines -- can at best close them.

Political Solution

China therefore faces a significant strategic problem. China must base its national security strategy on what the United States is capable of doing, not on what Beijing seems to want at the moment. China cannot counter the United States at sea, and its strategy of building ports in the Indian Ocean suffers from the fact that its costs are huge and the political conditions for access uncertain. The demands of creating a force capable of guaranteeing access runs counter to the security requirements inside China itself.

As long as the United States is the world's dominant naval power, China's strategy must be the political neutralization of the United States. But Beijing must make certain that Washington does not feel so pressured that it chooses blockade as an option. Therefore, China must present itself as an essential part of U.S. economic life. But the United States does not necessarily see China's economic activity as beneficial, and it is unclear whether China can maintain its unique position with the United States indefinitely. Other, cheaper alternatives are available. China's official rhetoric and hard-line stances, designed to generate nationalist support inside the country, might be useful politically, but they strain relations with the United States. They do not strain relations to the point of risking military conflict, but given China's weakness, any strain is dangerous. The Chinese feel they know how to walk the line between rhetoric and real danger with the United States. It is still a delicate balance.

There is a perception that China is a rising regional and even global power. It may be rising, but it is still far from solving its fundamental strategic problems and further yet from challenging the United States. The tensions within China's strategy are certainly debilitating, if not fatal. All of its options have serious weaknesses. China's real strategy must be to avoid having to make risky strategic choices. China has been fortunate for the past 30 years being able to avoid such decisions, but Beijing utterly lacks the tools required to reshape that environment. Considering how much of China's world is in play right now -- Sudanese energy disputes and Myanmar's political experimentation leap to mind -- this is essentially a policy of blind hope.
From Stratfor.com

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From theTrumpet.com

China’s belligerency is on display on the world stage once again.

Beijing intensified a 10-day standoff between the Philippines and China on Friday by sending a third ship to a shoal in the South China Sea where both sides claim sovereignty.

Saturday, April 14, 2012

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Tuesday, March 27, 2012

The Korean War and the U.S. Proto-Strategy

Thursday, March 22, 2012

Led by Berlin, a select group of 10 states has formed to ‘revive the ideal of a united Europe.’

The name “Berlin Club” evokes images of a secretive organization, one in which wealthy old aristocrats gather together to drink scotch and plot to conquer the world.

By Brad MacDonald

Suppression and Stability Strategies

Cultural Shifts and Challenges

Wednesday, March 21, 2012

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Challenged Interests

A Military Component

Internal Security vs. Power Projection

Political Solution

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