Last week’s column on our nation’s peacekeeping failures ruffled more
than a few feathers both within the defence establishment and corridors
of executive power. That was expected, because when those wasting our
resources in the name of our defence become exposed in the way our
peacekeeping capacity has rapidly deteriorated, all kinds of motives
will be imputed to divert attention from the wanton looting of the
defence and security budgets going on between the presidency and the
agencies concerned.
Far more humbling and sobering for me were the number of military
officers, both serving and retired that called, wrote, tweeted and sent
emails to confirm the essence of what we wrote last week, and offered
further stories, anecdotes and facts about the general decline of our
once-proud military and peacekeeping capabilities. It seems according to
one commentator, that the Nigerian military now has acquired all the
sad constituents of decay that have bedeviled the country. We will
share some of these today, looking a little closer at the quantity and
quality of the equipment of the Nigeria Army, facts about the declining
levels of our peacekeeping capacity and the disorganization and
mismanagement of our defence infrastructure in the last few years.
The backbone of any Army is the Infantry,
Armoured and Artillery Corps. They are the ones that fight the wars. All
other corps largely provide support services. Let us look at
information published in Failed States – 2030 authored by some colonels
of the US Air University in 2010. So consider first, some of the
equipment holdings of the Armoured Corps of the Nigerian Army, of the
129 T-55 main battle tanks owned, 29 are out of service. Similarly, only
36 of 150 Vickers Mk 3 battle tanks are functional. Out of 120 AML
Reconnaissance vehicles, only 40 were functional in 2010, and only four
Saxon Armoured Personnel Carriers were operational out of 75. No wonder,
we can only send a few broken-down APCs to Darfur.
Take the Artillery Corps. They initially owned 48 155mm FH-77B
Howitzers but only 25 are working. Out of 200 122mm D-74/D-30 Field
Guns, only 84 worked in 2010, while all the eight 122mm BM-21 rocket
launchers we had had broken down. The anti-tank weapons cache is
slightly better, though pathetic by the standards of modern warfare. We
have 3,000 RPGs for the entire Infantry Corps, explaining why our
soldiers in Darfur cannot have any to repel rebel attacks. We had 240 of
3.5″ RL M20 anti-tank guns but when you have a country where equipment
continually depreciates with no effort or resources put into maintenance
or replacement, barely 10% (24) of those guns are functional. It does
not get any better; only 12 of the 50 40mm Bofors L/60 air defense
weapons are still doing what they were purchased to do. The list goes on
and on with barely any of the categories having all their equipment
ready for the defence job for which they are meant. And yet, we budget
over nearly 1.2 percent of our GDP on defence!
It is also sad to note that one brand of the Armoured Personnel
Carrier, Cobra which is in the holding of the Nigerian troops in Darfur
is a topic of jest amongst other country contingents. It is reputed to
be Chinese manufacture, but the engines were sourced from another
country. The Cobra APCs are not up to 7 years old, yet they have all
broken down. In saner climes, whoever purchased such refurbished
contraption should be court-martialled or put on trial, but in Nigeria,
he probably got a promotion and national honour!
Apart from our major military equipment which to a large extent are
broken-down, there are quality issues with the personal equipment such
as boots, blankets and bullet proof vests, which to say the least is
pathetic. Some of the troops deployed to UNMIL in August to September
2010 lacked beds and mattresses; some had only mattresses, while others
slept on the bare floor, and the conditions have not changed for the
better.
As is usual in the case of Nigeria, the decline in quantity and
quality of defense equipment is ironically not as a result of funds
allocated to the sector; instead it is quite the contrary. As the
government allocates more resources to the sector, there is a
corresponding decline in the quality of our peacekeeping capacity. It is
also evident that the defence ministry specializes in purchasing
sub-standard equipment that are not durable.
There appears to be no
procedure or consideration made to replace already broken-down equipment
until the troops are left with nothing thereby giving room for a huge
allocation to be made for the purchase of such equipment which
eventually never happens.
Besides the sorry state of defence equipment, the quantity and
quality of the peace-keepers are on the decline. Quality, as shown in
last week’s article, is a function of training, both in hard military
fighting skills which we demonstrated in Congo in 1960 and ECOMOG in
Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, but are unfortunately losing as
shown by the ease with which our troops are being routinely disarmed and
killed in Sudan sometimes without fighting back. Training in “soft
skills” required in modern peacekeeping operations to address human
rights and sexual exploitation, disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR),etc. are absolutely necessary to enhance our
peacekeeping capabilities. These soft skills training has never been our
forte and it is disheartening to observe that no efforts have been put
towards changing the status quo.
Quality is also measured by logistic capability of the contingent
which includes the capacity and ability to transport a contingent to and
from theatre using a nation’s own air force, how it maintains those
troops in the theatre in terms of feeding, medicals, accommodation,
water, sanitation, minor engineering, transport needs and recreation.
This is the area where countries make the money UN pays them for
logistics but Nigeria scores abysmally low here and our soldiers are
among the worst in almost all operations we participate.
Apart from loss
of money, there is the attendant loss of prestige in fielding a rag tag
army that cannot cater for itself while other national contingents from
even poorer African countries are doing far better with Ghana, Rwanda,
and Ethiopia just to mention a few.
The MOU signed in January 2008, between Nigeria and the UN for troops
deployment to UNAMID in Sudan, provides that Nigeria will be paid a sum
of $83,422,020 each quarter, all things being equal, for deploying 4
infantry battalions. However, out of this amount, for a particular
quarter, the country was only able to claim, a paltry $15,902,122.07
thus losing a whopping $67,519,897.93. If one takes into account that
the MOU was signed in January 2008 at the beginning of UNAMID, an
operation which is still ongoing, and also the fact that the logistical
situation of the Nigerian units in the operations has not improved since
then, and may have even deteriorated further, the losses as at present
(2012) would be colossal as Nigeria would have lost a total of at least
$804 million since the operation started, a potential revenue loss of
N128 billion, or nearly a third of the defence budget in 2012.
Sadly, in UNMIL, the Nigerian units were rated lowest among all
national contingents deployed to the operation meeting barely 60% of COE
obligations thus forfeiting another $325,196,93 for the corresponding
period. In typical fire brigade manner, the Nigerian government made
the necessary minimal purchases for the contingents to ensure that the
Nigerian units were not deactivated following the threat by the UN to do
so.
Nigeria was until recently, the biggest African contributor in terms
of quantity to global peacekeeping. Quantity is assessed in terms of the
number of military and police peacekeepers that each member state
contributes to the UN peacekeeping. The UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, towards the end of 1999 began to display and keep monthly
records of peacekeeping contributions by each country. The countries are
then ranked in order of the total number of peacekeepers they
contribute monthly to the UN.
It is interesting to note that for more than 3 years unbroken,
Nigeria was placed fourth largest contributor to UN peace operations
behind only India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and also the largest
contributor among African countries. Unfortunately, once again, rather
than improve, Nigeria has slipped back a place from December 2011 to
number 5 and Nigeria’s fourth position is occupied by Ethiopia, another
less-endowed African country. Another record which Nigeria held up till
the end of 2011 was being the highest contributor of female
peacekeepers. Once again, the position has been taken by South Africa.
Until recently, Nigeria held top mission leadership positions in the
UN such as Special Representative of the Secretary General, Force
Commander, Deputy Force Commander, Sector Commanders and Police
Commissioner. This no longer obtains due to the deterioration in the
quality and quantity of our peacekeeping contributions. For instance,
Nigeria lost UNAMID command to Rwanda when General Agwai was not given
an extension. Nigeria also lost some positions in UNMIL Liberia.
Currently, only Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari of UNAMID and General Moses
Obi, Force Commander UNMISS occupy such posts. A contributory factor to
Nigeria losing such positions is the dysfunctional selection process
into the peacekeeping force that allows for people to be sent for
missions not based on their abilities but on who they know. Eventually
they compete with the best from other countries and as expected, cannot
beat the competition and meet the rigorous standards of the UN.
Finally, corruption within the Nigerian Army is a major mitigating
factor to any meaningful progress in the defence sector. Rather than use
the UN peacekeeping reimbursements (which are not claimed in full due
to our poor performance) gained from participation in peacekeeping to
better equip and train the armed forces, these monies are diverted for
political interests such as funding political campaigns. In 2010, there
was a case where the national,assembly raised queries regarding funds
earmarked to buy equipment for peacekeeping which was never spent. The
issue died a natural death as soon as the relevant committee was
“carried along” in Nigerian political parlance!
In conclusion, the hard earned reputation of Nigeria in international
peacekeeping gained through the efforts of late General Aguiyi-Ironsi,
Generals Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Mohammed, Olusegun Obasanjo and T Y
Danjuma, as far back as 1960 is about to be lost as our contingents are
now rated among the worst in terms of training, logistics and
professionalism. Even the fighting reputation we used to have no longer
exists as all it takes to disarm our ill equipped troops are rag tag
bandits. Something needs to be done. Is the commander-in-chief
listening, or do all Nigerians need to take up arms against the state,
become militants, insurgents or terrorists to attract his attention?
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