By George Friedman
The idea of Germany having an independent national strategy runs
counter to everything that Germany has wanted to be since World War II
and everything the world has wanted from Germany. In a way, the entire
structure of modern Europe was created to take advantage of Germany's
economic dynamism while avoiding the threat of German domination. In
writing about German strategy, I am raising the possibility that the
basic structure of Western Europe since World War II and of Europe as a
whole since 1991 is coming to a close.
If so, then the question is whether historical patterns of German
strategy will emerge or something new is coming. It is, of course,
always possible that the old post-war model can be preserved. Whichever
it is, the future of German strategy is certainly the most important
question in Europe and quite possibly in the world.
Origins of Germany's Strategy
Before 1871, when Germany was fragmented into a large number of small
states, it did not pose a challenge to Europe. Rather, it served as a
buffer between France on one side and Russia and Austria on the other.
Napoleon and his campaign to dominate Europe first changed the status of
Germany, both overcoming the barrier and provoking the rise of Prussia,
a powerful German entity. Prussia became instrumental in creating a
united Germany in 1871, and with that, the geopolitics of Europe
changed.
What had been a morass of states became not only a unified country
but also the most economically dynamic country in Europe -- and the one
with the most substantial ground forces. Germany was also inherently
insecure. Lacking any real strategic depth, Germany could not survive a
simultaneous attack by France and Russia. Therefore, Germany's core
strategy was to prevent the emergence of an alliance between France and
Russia. However, in the event that there was no alliance between France
and Russia, Germany was always tempted to solve the problem in a more
controlled and secure way, by defeating France and ending the threat of
an alliance. This is the strategy Germany has chosen for most of its
existence.
The dynamism of Germany did not create the effect that Germany
wanted. Rather than split France and Russia, the threat of a united
Germany drew them together. It was clear to France and Russia that
without an alliance, Germany would pick them off individually. In many
ways, France and Russia benefited from an economically dynamic Germany.
It not only stimulated their own economies but also provided an
alternative to British goods and capital. Nevertheless, the economic
benefits of relations with Germany did not eliminate the fear of
Germany. The idea that economics rule the decisions of nations is
insufficient for explaining their behavior.
Germany was confronted with a strategic problem. By the early 20th
century the Triple Entente, signed in 1907, had allied Russia, France
and the United Kingdom. If they attacked simultaneously at a time of
their choosing, these countries could destroy Germany. Therefore,
Germany's only defense was to launch a war at a time of its choosing,
defeat one of these countries and deal with the others at its leisure.
During both World War I and World War II, Germany first struck at France
and then turned to deal with Russia while keeping the United Kingdom at
bay. In both wars, the strategy failed. In World War I, Germany failed
to defeat France and found itself in an extended war on two fronts. In
World War II, it defeated France but failed to defeat Russia, allowing
time for an Anglo-American counterattack in the west.
Binding Germany to Europe
Germany was divided after World War II. Whatever the first
inclinations of the victors, it became clear that a rearmed West Germany
was essential if the Soviet Union was going to be contained. If Germany
was to be rearmed, its economy had to be encouraged to grow, and what
followed was the German economic miracle. Germany again became the most
dynamic part of Europe.
The issue was to prevent Germany from returning to the pursuit of an
autonomous national strategy, both because it could not resist the
Soviet forces to the east by itself and, more important, because the
West could not tolerate the re-emergence of divisive and dangerous power
politics in Europe. The key was binding Germany to the rest of Europe
militarily and economically. Put another way, the key was to make
certain that German and French interests coincided, since tension
between France and Germany had been one of the triggers of prior wars
since 1871. Obviously, this also included other Western European
countries, but it was Germany's relationship with France that was most
important.
Militarily, German and French interests were tied together under the
NATO alliance even after France withdrew from the NATO Military
Committee under Charles de Gaulle. Economically, Germany was bound with
Europe through the emergence of more sophisticated multilateral economic
organizations that ultimately evolved into the European Union.
After World War II, West Germany's strategy was threefold. First, it
had to defend itself against the Soviet Union in concert with an
alliance that would effectively command its military through NATO. This
would limit German sovereignty but eliminate the perception of Germany
as a threat. Second, it would align its economy with that of the rest of
Europe, pursuing prosperity without undermining the prosperity of other
countries. Third, it would exercise internal political sovereignty,
reclaiming its rights as a nation without posing a geopolitical threat
to Western Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this was extended
to include Eastern European states.
The strategy worked well. There was no war with the Soviets. There
was no fundamental conflict in Western Europe and certainly none that
was military in nature. The European economy in general, and the German
economy in particular, surged once East Germany had been reintegrated
with West Germany. With reintegration, German internal sovereignty was
insured. Most important, France remained linked to Germany via the
European Union and NATO. Russia, or what was left after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, was relatively secure so long as Germany remained part
of European structures. The historical strategic problem Germany had
faced appeared solved.
Europe's Economic Crisis
The situation became more complex after 2008. Germany's formal
relationship with NATO remained intact, but without the common threat of
the Soviet Union, the alliance was fracturing over the divergent
national interests of its members. The European Union had become
Germany's focus, and the bloc had come under intense pressure that made
the prior alignment of all European countries more dubious. Germany
needed the European Union. It needed it for the reasons that have
existed since World War II: as a foundation of its relationship with
France and as a means to ensure that national interest would not
generate the kinds of conflicts that had existed in the past.
It needed the European Union for another reason as well. Germany is
the second-largest exporter in the world. It exports to many countries,
but Europe is a critical customer. The free-trade zone that was the
foundation of the European Union was also one of the foundations of the
German economy. Protectionism in general, but certainly protectionism in
Europe, threatened Germany, whose industrial plant substantially
outstripped its domestic consumption. The pricing of the euro aided
German exports, and regulations in Brussels gave Germany other
advantages. The European Union, as it existed between 1991 and 2008, was
critical to Germany.
However, the European Union no longer functions as it once did. The
economic dynamics of Europe have placed many countries at a substantial
disadvantage, and the economic crisis of 2008 triggered a sovereign debt
crisis and banking crisis in Europe.
There were two possible solutions in the broadest sense. One was that
the countries in crisis impose austerity in order to find the resources
to solve their problem. The other was that the prosperous part of
Europe underwrites the debts, sparing these countries the burden of
austerity. The solution that has been chosen is obviously a combination
of the two, but the precise makeup of that combination was and remains a
complex matter for negotiation.
Germany needs the European Union to survive for both political and
economic reasons. The problem is that it is not clear that a stable
economic solution can emerge that will be supported by the political
systems in Europe.
Germany is prepared to bail out other European countries if they
impose austerity and then take steps to make sure that the austerity is
actually implemented to the degree necessary and that the crisis is not
repeated. From Germany's point of view, the roots of the crisis lie in
the fiscal policies of the troubled countries. Therefore, the German
price for underwriting part of the debt is that European bureaucrats,
heavily oriented toward German policies, be effectively put in charge of
the finances of countries receiving aid against default.
This would mean that these countries would not control either taxes
or budgets through their political system. It would be an assault on
democracy and national sovereignty. Obviously, there has been a great
deal of opposition from potential recipients of aid, but it is also
opposed by some countries that see it as something that would vastly
increase the power of Germany. If you accept the German view, which is
that the debt crisis was the result of reckless spending, then Germany's
proposal is reasonable. If you accept the view of southern Europe,
which is that the crisis was the result of the European Union's design,
then what Germany is proposing is the imposition of German power via
economics.
It is difficult to imagine a vast surrender of sovereignty to a
German-dominated EU bureaucracy, whatever the economic cost. It is also
difficult to imagine Germany underwriting the debt without some controls
beyond promises; even if the European Union is vitally important to the
Germans, German public opinion will not permit it. Finally, it is
difficult to see how, in the long term, the Europeans can reconcile
their differences on this issue. The issue must come to a head, if not
in this financial crisis then in the next -- and there is always a next
crisis.
An Alternative Strategy
In the meantime, the basic framework of Europe has changed since
1991. Russia remains a shadow of the Soviet Union, but it has become a
major exporter of natural gas. Germany depends on that natural gas even
as it searches for alternatives. Russia is badly in need of technology,
which Germany has in abundance. Germany does not want to invite in any
more immigrants out of fear of instability. However, with a declining
population, Germany must do something.
Russia also has a declining population, but even so, it has a surplus
of workers, both unemployed and underemployed. If the workers cannot be
brought to the factories, the factories can be brought to the workers.
In short, there is substantial synergy between the Russian and German
economies. Add to this that the Germans feel under heavy pressure from
the United States to engage in actions the Germans want to be left out
of, while the Russians see the Americans as a threat to their interests,
and there are politico-military interests that Germany and Russia have
in common.
NATO is badly frayed. The European Union is under tremendous pressure
and national interests are now dominating European interests. Germany's
ability to use the European Union for economic ends has not dissipated
but can no longer be relied on over the long term. Therefore, it follows
that Germany must be considering an alternative strategy. Its
relationship with Russia is such a strategy.
Germany is not an aggressive power. The foundation of its current
strategy is its relationship with France in the context of the European
Union. The current French government under President Nicolas Sarkozy is
certainly committed to this relationship, but the French political
system, like those of other European countries, is under intense
pressure. The coming elections in France are uncertain, and the ones
after that are even less predictable. The willingness of France to
engage with Germany, which has a massive trade imbalance with France, is
an unknown.
However, Germany's strategic interest is not necessarily a
relationship with France but a relationship with either France or Russia
to avoid being surrounded by hostile powers. For Germany, a
relationship with Russia does as well as one with France. An ideal
situation for Germany would be a Franco-German-Russian entente. Such an
alliance has been tried in the past, but its weakness is that it would
provide too much security to Germany, allowing it to be more assertive.
Normally, France and Russia have opposed Germany, but in this case, it
is certainly possible to have a continuation of the Franco-German
alliance or a Russo-French alliance. Indeed, a three-way alliance might
be possible as well.
Germany's current strategy is to preserve the European Union and its
relationship with France while drawing Russia closer into Europe. The
difficulty of this strategy is that Germany's trade policies are
difficult for other European countries to manage, including France. If
Germany faces an impossible situation with the European Union, the
second strategic option would be a three-way alliance, with a modified
European Union or perhaps outside of the EU structure. If France decides
it has other interests, such as its idea of a Mediterranean Union, then
a German-Russian relationship becomes a real possibility.
A German-Russian relationship would have the potential to tilt the
balance of power in the world. The United States is currently the
dominant power, but the combination of German technology and Russian
resources -- an idea dreamt of by many in the past -- would become a
challenge on a global basis. Of course, there are bad memories on both
sides, and trust in the deepest sense would be hard to come by. But
although alliances rely on trust, it does not necessarily have to be
deep-seated trust.
Germany's strategy, therefore, is still locked in the EU paradigm.
However, if the EU paradigm becomes unsupportable, then other strategies
will have to be found. The Russo-German relationship already exists and
is deepening. Germany thinks of it in the context of the European
Union, but if the European Union weakens, Russia becomes Germany's
natural alternative.
From
Stratfor.com
