Germany in Europe

German Chancellor Angela Merkel went to St. Petersburg last week for meetings with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. The central question on the table was Germany’s position on NATO expansion, particularly with regard to Ukraine and Georgia. Merkel made it clear at a joint press conference that Germany would oppose NATO membership for both of these countries, and that it would even oppose placing the countries on the path to membership. Since NATO operates on the basis of consensus, any member nation can effectively block any candidate from NATO membership.

The fact that Merkel and Germany have chosen this path is of great significance. Merkel acted in full knowledge of the U.S. view on the matter and is prepared to resist any American pressure that might follow. It should be remembered that Merkel might be the most pro-American politician in Germany, and perhaps its most pro-American chancellor in years. Moreover, as an East German, she has a deep unease about the Russians. Reality, however, overrode her personal inclinations. More than other countries, Germany does not want to alienate the United States. But it is in a position to face American pressure should any come.

Energy Dependence and Defense Spending

In one sense, Merkel’s reasons for her stance are simple. Germany is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas. If the supply were cut off, Germany’s situation would be desperate — or at least close enough that the distinction would be academic. Russia might decide it could not afford to cut off natural gas exports, but Merkel is dealing with a fundamental German interest, and risking that for Ukrainian or Georgian membership in NATO is not something she is prepared to do.

She can’t bank on Russian caution in a matter such as this, particularly when the Russians seem to be in an incautious mood. Germany is, of course, looking to alternative sources of energy for the future, and in five years its dependence on Russia might not be nearly as significant. But five years is a long time to hold your breath, and Germany can’t do it.

The German move is not just about natural gas, however. Germany views the U.S. obsession with NATO expansion as simply not in Germany’s interests.
First, expanding NATO guarantees to Ukraine and Georgia is meaningless. NATO and the United States don’t have the military means to protect Ukraine or Georgia, and incorporating them into the alliance would not increase European security. From a military standpoint, NATO membership for the two former Soviet republics is an empty gesture, while from a political standpoint, Berlin sees it as designed to irritate the Russians for no clear purpose.
Next, were NATO prepared to protect Ukraine and Georgia, all NATO countries including Germany would be forced to increase defense expenditures substantially. This is not something that Germany and the rest of NATO want to do.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Germany spent 1945-1992 being the potential prime battleground of the Cold War. It spent 1992-2008 not being the potential prime battleground. Germany prefers the latter, and it does not intend to be drawn into a new Cold War under any circumstances. This has profound implications for the future of both NATO and U.S.-German relations.

Germany is thus in the midst of a strategic crisis in which it must make some fundamental decisions. To understand the decisions Germany has to make, we need to understand the country’s geopolitical problem and the decisions it has made in the past.

The German Geopolitical Problem

Until 1871, Germany was fragmented into dozens of small states — kingdoms, duchies, principalities, etc. — comprising the remnants of the Holy Roman Empire. The German-speaking world was torn apart by internal tensions and the constant manipulation of foreign powers.
The southeastern part of the German-speaking world, Austria, was the center of the multinational Hapsburg Empire. It was Roman Catholic and was continually intruding into the predominantly Catholic regions of the rest of Germany, particularly Bavaria. The French were constantly poaching in the Rhineland and manipulating the balance of power among the German states. Russia was always looming to the east, where it bordered the major Protestant German power, Prussia. (Poland at the time was divided among Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary.) Germany was perpetually the victim of great powers, a condition which Prussia spent the roughly half-century between Waterloo and German unification trying to correct.

To unify Germany, Prussia had to do more than dominate the Germans. It had to fight two wars. The first was in 1866 with the Hapsburg Empire, which Prussia defeated in seven weeks, ending Hapsburg influence in Germany and ultimately reducing Austria-Hungary to Germany’s junior partner. The second war was in 1870-1871, when Prussia led a German coalition that defeated France. That defeat ended French influence in the Rhineland and gave Prussia the space in which to create a modern, unified Germany. Russia, which was pleased to see both Austria-Hungary and France defeated and viewed a united Germany as a buffer against another French invasion, did not try to block unification.

German unification changed the dynamic of Europe. First, it created a large nation in the heart of Europe between France and Russia. United, Germany was economically dynamic, and its growth outstripped that of France and the United Kingdom. Moreover, it became a naval power, developing a substantial force that at some point could challenge British naval hegemony. It became a major exporting power, taking markets from Britain and France. And in looking around for room to maneuver, Germany began looking east toward Russia. In short, Germany was more than a nation — it was a geopolitical problem.

Germany’s strategic problem was that if the French and Russians attacked Germany simultaneously, with Britain blockading its ports, Germany would lose and revert to its pre-1871 chaos. Given French, Russian and British interest in shattering Germany, Germany had to assume that such an attack would come. Therefore, since the Germans could not fight on two fronts simultaneously, they needed to fight a war pre-emptively, attacking France or Russia first, defeating it and then turning their full strength on the other — all before Britain’s naval blockade could begin to hurt. Germany’s only defense was a two-stage offense that was as complex as a ballet, and would be catastrophic if it failed.

In World War I, executing the Schlieffen Plan, the Germans attacked France first while trying to simply block the Russians. The plan was to first occupy the channel coast and Paris before the United Kingdom could get into the game and before Russia could fully mobilize, and then to knock out Russia. The plan failed in 1914 at the First Battle of the Marnes, and rather than lightning victory, Germany got bogged down in a multifront war costing millions of lives and lasting years. Even so, Germany almost won the war of attrition, causing the United States to intervene and deprive Berlin of victory.

In World War II, the Germans had learned their lesson, so instead of trying to pin down Russia, they entered into a treaty with the Soviets. This secured Germany’s rear by dividing Poland with the Soviet Union. The Soviets agreed to the treaty, expecting Adolf Hitler’s forces to attack France and bog down as Germany had in World War I. The Soviets would then roll West after the bloodletting had drained the rest of Europe. The Germans stunned the Russians by defeating France in six weeks and then turning on the Russians. The Russian front turned into an endless bloodletting, and once again the Americans helped deliver the final blow.

The consequence of the war was the division of Germany into three parts — an independent Austria, a Western-occupied West Germany and a Soviet-occupied East Germany. West Germany again faced the Russian problem. Its eastern part was occupied, and West Germany could not possibly defend itself on its own. It found itself integrated into an American-dominated alliance system, NATO, which was designed to block the Soviets. West and East Germany would serve as the primary battleground of any Soviet attack, with Soviet armor facing U.S. armor, airpower and tactical nuclear weapons. For the Germans, the Cold War was probably more dangerous than either of the previous wars. Whatever the war’s outcome, Germany stood a pretty good chance of being annihilated if it took place.

On the upside, the Cold War did settle Franco-German tensions, which were half of Germany’s strategic problem. Indeed, one of the by-products of the Cold War was the emergence of the European Community, which ultimately became the European Union. This saw German economic union and integration with France, which along with NATO’s military integration guaranteed economic growth and the end of any military threat to Germany from the west. For the first time in centuries, the Rhine was not at risk. Germany’s south was secure, and once the Soviet Union collapsed, there was no threat from the east, either.

United and Secure at Last?

For the first time in centuries, Germany was both united and militarily secure. But underneath it all, the Germans retained their primordial fear of being caught between France and Russia. Berlin understood that this was far from a mature reality; it was no more than a theoretical problem at the moment. But the Germans also understand how quickly things can change. On one level, the problem was nothing more than the economic emphasis of the European Union compared to the geopolitical focus of Russia. But on a deeper level, Germany was, as always, caught between the potentially competing demands of Russia and the West. Even if the problem were small now, there were no guarantees that it wouldn’t grow.

This was the context in which Germany viewed the Russo-Georgian war in August. Berlin saw not only the United States moving toward a hostile relationship with Russia, but also the United Kingdom and France going down the same path.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who happened to hold the rotating EU presidency at the time, went to Moscow to negotiate a cease-fire on behalf of the European Union. When the Russians seemed unwilling to comply with the terms negotiated, France became highly critical of Russia and inclined to back some sort of sanctions at the EU summit on Georgia. With the United Kingdom being even more adamant, Germany saw a worst-case scenario looming on the distant horizon: It understood that the pleasant security of the post-Cold War world was at an end, and that it had to craft a new national strategy.

From Germany’s point of view, the re-emergence of Russian influence in the former Soviet Union might be something that could have been blocked in the 1990s, but by 2008, it had become inevitable. The Germans saw that economic relations in the former Soviet Union — and not only energy issues — created a complementary relationship between Russia and its former empire. Between natural affinities and Russian power, a Russian sphere of influence, if not a formal structure, was inevitable. It was an emerging reality that could not be reversed.

France has Poland and Germany between itself and Russia. Britain has that plus the English Channel, and the United States has all that plus the Atlantic Ocean. The farther away from Russia one is, the more comfortable one can be challenging Moscow. But Germany has only Poland as a buffer. For any nation serious about resisting Russian power, the first question is how to assure the security of the Baltic countries, a long-vulnerable salient running north from Poland. The answer would be to station NATO forces in the Baltics and in Poland, and Berlin understood that Germany would be both the logistical base for these forces as well as the likely source of troops. But Germany’s appetite for sending troops to Poland and the Baltics has been satiated. This was not a course Germany wanted to take.

Pondering German History

We suspect that Merkel knew something else; namely, that all the comfortable assumptions about what was possible and impossible — that the Russians wouldn’t dare attack the Baltics — are dubious in the extreme. Nothing in German history would convince any reasonable German that military action to achieve national ends is unthinkable. Nor are the Germans prepared to dismiss the re-emergence of Russian military power. The Germans had been economically and militarily shattered in 1932. By 1938, they were the major power in Europe. As long as their officer corps and technological knowledge base were intact, regeneration could move swiftly.

The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and its military power crumbled. But as was the case in Weimar Germany, the Russian officer corps remained relatively intact and the KGB, the heart of the Soviet state, remained intact if renamed. So did the technological base that made the Soviets a global power. As with Germany after both world wars, Russia was in chaos, but its fragments remained, awaiting reconstruction. The Germans were not about to dismiss Russia’s ability to regenerate — they know their own history too well to do that.

If Germany were to join those who call for NATO expansion, the first step toward a confrontation with Russia would have been taken. The second step would be guaranteeing the security of the Baltics and Poland. America would make the speeches, and Germans would man the line. After spending most of the last century fighting or preparing to fight the Russians, the Germans looked around at the condition of their allies and opted out.

The Germans see their economic commitment as being to the European Union. That binds them to the French, and this is not a bond they can or want to break. But the European Union carries no political or military force in relation to the Russians. Beyond economics, it is a debating society. NATO, as an institution built to resist the Russians, is in an advanced state of decay. To resurrect it, the Germans would have to pay a steep economic price. And if they paid that price, they would be carrying much of the strategic risk.

So while Germany remains committed to its economic relationship with the West, it does not intend to enter into a military commitment against the Russians at this time. If the Americans want to send troops to protect the Baltics and Poland, they are welcome to do so. Germany has no objection — nor do they object to a French or British presence there. Indeed, once such forces were committed, Germany might reconsider its position. But since military deployments in significant numbers are unlikely anytime soon, the Germans view grand U.S. statements about expanded NATO membership as mere bravado by a Washington that is prepared to risk little.

NATO After the German Shift

Therefore, Merkel went to St. Petersburg and told the Russians that Germany does not favor NATO expansion. More than that, the Germans at least implicitly told the Russians that they have a free hand in the former Soviet Union as far as Germany is concerned — an assertion that cost Berlin nothing, since the Russians do enjoy a free hand there. But even more critically, Merkel signaled to the Russians and the West that Germany does not intend to be trapped between Western ambitions and Russian power this time. It does not want to recreate the situation of the two world wars or the Cold War, so Berlin will stay close to France economically and also will accommodate the Russians.
The Germans will thus block NATO’s ambitions, something that represents a dramatic shift in the Western alliance. This shift in fact has been unfolding for quite a while, but it took the Russo-Georgian war to reveal the change.
NATO has no real military power to project to the east, and none can be created without a major German effort, which is not forthcoming. The German shift leaves the Baltic countries exposed and extremely worried, as they should be. It also leaves the Poles in their traditional position of counting on countries far away to guarantee their national security. In 1939, Warsaw counted on the British and French; today, Warsaw depends on the United States. As in 1939, these guarantees are tenuous, but they are all the Poles have.

The United States has the option of placing a nuclear umbrella over the Baltics and Eastern Europe, which would guarantee a nuclear strike on Russia in the event of an attack in either place. While this was the guarantee made to Western Europe in the Cold War, it is unlikely that the United States is prepared for global thermonuclear war over Estonia’s fate. Such a U.S. guarantee to the Baltics and Eastern Europe simply would not represent a credible threat.
The other U.S. option is a major insertion of American forces either by sea through Danish waters or via French and German ports and railways, assuming France or Germany would permit their facilities to be used for such a deployment. But this option is academic at the moment. The United States could not deploy more than symbolic forces even if it wanted to. For the moment, NATO is therefore an entity that issues proclamations, not a functioning military alliance, in spite of (or perhaps because of) deployments in Afghanistan.

Everything in German history has led to this moment. The country is united and wants to be secure. It will not play the role it was forced into during the Cold War, nor will it play geopolitical poker as it did in the first and second world wars. And that means NATO is permanently and profoundly broken. The German question now turns into the Russian question: If Germany is out of the game, what is to be done about Russia?

THE ABOVE REPORT HAS BEEN COURTESY: STRATFOR INTELLIGENCE

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Geo politic: A Resurgent Russia

Russia is attempting to reforge its Cold War-era influence in its near abroad. This is not simply an issue of nostalgia, but a perfectly logical and predictable reaction to the Russian environment. Russia lacks easily definable, easily defendable borders. There is no redoubt to which the Russians can withdraw, and the only security they know comes from establishing buffers — buffers which tend to be lost in times of crisis. The alternative is for Russia to simply trust other states to leave it alone. Considering Russia’s history of occupations, from the Mongol horde to Napoleonic France to Hitler’s Germany, it is not difficult to surmise why the Russians tend to choose a more activist set of policies.

As such, the country tends to expand and contract like a beating heart — gobbling up nearby territories in times of strength, and then contracting and losing those territories in times of weakness. Rather than what Westerners think of as a traditional nation-state, Russia has always been a multiethnic empire, heavily stocked with non-Russian (and even non-Orthodox) minorities. Keeping those minorities from damaging central control requires a strong internal security and intelligence arm, and hence we get the Cheka, the KGB, and now the FSB.

Nature of the Budding Conflict

Combine a security policy thoroughly wedded to expansion with an internal stabilization policy that institutionalizes terror, and it is understandable why most of Russia’s neighbors do not like Moscow very much. A fair portion of Western history revolves around the formation and shifting of coalitions to manage Russian insecurities.

In the American case specifically, the issue is one of continental control. The United States is the only country in the world that effectively controls an entire continent. Mexico and Canada have been sufficiently intimidated so that they can operate independently only in a very limited sense. (Technically, Australia controls a continent, but with the some 85 percent of its territory unusable, it is more accurate in geopolitical terms to think of it as a small archipelago with some very long bridges.) This grants the United States not only a potentially massive internal market, but also the ability to project power without the fear of facing rearguard security threats. U.S. forces can be focused almost entirely on offensive operations, whereas potential competitors in Eurasia must constantly be on their guard about the neighbors.

The only thing that could threaten U.S. security would be the rise of a Eurasian continental hegemon. For the past 60 years, Russia (or the Soviet Union) has been the only entity that has had a chance of achieving that, largely due to its geographic reach. U.S. strategy for coping with this is simple: containment, or the creation of a network of allies to hedge in Russian political, economic and military expansion. NATO is the most obvious manifestation of this policy imperative, while the Sino-Soviet split is the most dramatic one.

Containment requires that United States counter Russian expansionism at every turn, crafting a new coalition wherever Russia attempts to break out of the strategic ring, and if necessary committing direct U.S. forces to the effort. The Korean and Vietnam wars — both traumatic periods in American history — were manifestations of this effort, as were the Berlin airlift and the backing of Islamist militants in Afghanistan (who incidentally went on to form al Qaeda).
The Georgian war in August was simply the first effort by a resurging Russia to pulse out, expand its security buffer and, ideally, in the Kremlin’s plans, break out of the post-Cold War noose that other powers have tied. The Americans (and others) will react as they did during the Cold War: by building coalitions to constrain Russian expansion. In Europe, the challenges will be to keep the Germans on board and to keep NATO cohesive. In the Caucasus, the United States will need to deftly manage its Turkish alliance and find a means of engaging Iran. In China and Japan, economic conflicts will undoubtedly take a backseat to security cooperation.

Russia and the United States will struggle in all of these areas, consisting as they do the Russian borderlands. Most of the locations will feel familiar, as Russia’s near abroad has been Russia’s near abroad for nearly 300 years. Those locations — the Baltics, Austria, Ukraine, Serbia, Turkey, Central Asia and Mongolia — that defined Russia’s conflicts in times gone by will surface again. Such is the tapestry of history: the major powers seeking advantage in the same places over and over again.

The New Old-Front

But not all of those fronts are in Eurasia. So long as U.S. power projection puts the Russians on the defensive, it is only a matter of time before something along the cordon cracks and the Russians are either fighting a land war or facing a local insurrection. Russia must keep U.S. efforts dispersed and captured by events as far away from the Russian periphery as possible — preferably where Russian strengths can exploit American weakness.

So where is that?

Geography dictates that U.S. strength involves coalition building based on mutual interest and long-range force projection, and internal U.S. harmony is such that America’s intelligence and security agencies have no need to shine. Unlike Russia, the United States does not have large, unruly, resentful, conquered populations to keep in line. In contrast, recall that the multiethnic nature of the Russian state requires a powerful security and intelligence apparatus. No place better reflects Russia’s intelligence strengths and America’s intelligence weakness than Latin America.

The United States faces no traditional security threats in its backyard. South America is in essence a hollow continent, populated only on the edges and thus lacking a deep enough hinterland to ever coalesce into a single hegemonic power. Central America and southern Mexico are similarly fractured, primarily due to rugged terrain. Northern Mexico (like Canada) is too economically dependent upon the United States to seriously consider anything more vibrant than ideological hostility toward Washington. Faced with this kind of local competition, the United States simply does not worry too much about the rest of the Western Hemisphere — except when someone comes to visit.

Stretching back to the time of the Monroe Doctrine, Washington’s Latin American policy has been very simple. The United States does not feel threatened by any local power, but it feels inordinately threatened by any Eastern Hemispheric power that could ally with a local entity. Latin American entities cannot greatly harm American interests themselves, but they can be used as fulcrums by hostile states further abroad to strike at the core of the United States’ power: its undisputed command of North America.

It is a fairly straightforward exercise to predict where Russian activity will reach its deepest. One only needs to revisit Cold War history. Future Russian efforts can be broken down into three broad categories: naval interdiction, drug facilitation and direct territorial challenge.

Naval Interdiction

Naval interdiction represents the longest sustained fear of American policymakers. Among the earliest U.S. foreign efforts after securing the mainland was asserting control over the various waterways used for approaching North America. Key in this American geopolitical imperative is the neutralization of Cuba. All the naval power-projection capabilities in the world mean very little if Cuba is both hostile and serving as a basing ground for an extra-hemispheric power.
The U.S. Gulf Coast is not only the heart of the country’s energy industry, but the body of water that allows the United States to function as a unified polity and economy. The Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi river basins all drain to New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. The economic strength of these basins depends upon access to oceanic shipping. A hostile power in Cuba could fairly easily seal both the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan Channel, reducing the Gulf of Mexico to little more than a lake.

Building on the idea of naval interdiction, there is another key asset the Soviets targeted at which the Russians are sure to attempt a reprise: the Panama Canal. For both economic and military reasons, it is enormously convenient to not have to sail around the Americas, especially because U.S. economic and military power is based on maritime power and access. In the Cold War, the Soviets established friendly relations with Nicaragua and arranged for a favorable political evolution on the Caribbean island of Grenada. Like Cuba, these two locations are of dubious importance by themselves. But take them together — and add in a Soviet air base at each location as well as in Cuba — and there is a triangle of Soviet airpower that can threaten access to the Panama Canal.

Drug Facilitation

The next stage — drug facilitation — is somewhat trickier. South America is a wide and varying land with very little to offer Russian interests. Most of the states are commodity providers, much like the Soviet Union was and Russia is today, so they are seen as economic competitors. Politically, they are useful as anti-American bastions, so the Kremlin encourages such behavior whenever possible. But even if every country in South America were run by anti-American governments, it would not overly concern Washington; these states, alone or en masse, lack the ability to threaten American interests … in all ways but one.

The drug trade undermines American society from within, generating massive costs for social stability, law enforcement, the health system and trade. During the Cold War, the Soviets dabbled with narcotics producers and smugglers, from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the highland coca farmers of Bolivia. It is not so much that the Soviets encouraged the drug trade directly, but that they encouraged any group they saw as ideologically useful.

Stratfor expects future Russian involvement in such activities to eclipse those of the past. After the Soviet fall, many FSB agents were forced to find new means to financially support themselves. (Remember it was not until 1999 that Vladimir Putin took over the Russian government and began treating Russian intelligence like a bona fide state asset again.) The Soviet fall led many FSB agents, who already possessed more than a passing familiarity with things such as smuggling and organized crime, directly into the heart of such activities. Most of those agents are — formally or not — back in the service of the Russian government, now with a decade of gritty experience on the less savory side of intelligence under their belts. And they now have a deeply personal financial interest in the outcome of future operations.

Drug groups do not need cash from the Russians, but they do need weaponry and a touch of training — needs which dovetail perfectly with the Russians’ strengths. Obviously, Russian state involvement in such areas will be far from overt; it just does not do to ship weapons to the FARC or to one side of the brewing Bolivian civil war with CNN watching. But this is a challenge the Russians are good at meeting. One of Russia’s current deputy prime ministers, Igor Sechin, was the USSR’s point man for weapons smuggling to much of Latin America and the Middle East. This really is old hat for them.

U.S. Stability

Finally, there is the issue of direct threats to U.S. stability, and this point rests solely on Mexico. With more than 100 million people, a growing economy and Atlantic and Pacific ports, Mexico is the only country in the Western Hemisphere that could theoretically (which is hardly to say inevitably) threaten U.S. dominance in North America. During the Cold War, Russian intelligence gave Mexico more than its share of jolts in efforts to cause chronic problems for the United States. In fact, the Mexico City KGB station was, and remains today, the biggest in the world. The Mexico City riots of 1968 were in part Soviet-inspired, and while ultimately unsuccessful at overthrowing the Mexican government, they remain a testament to the reach of Soviet intelligence. The security problems that would be created by the presence of a hostile state the size of Mexico on the southern U.S. border are as obvious as they would be dangerous.

As with involvement in drug activities, which incidentally are likely to overlap in Mexico, Stratfor expects Russia to be particularly active in destabilizing Mexico in the years ahead. But while an anti-American state is still a Russian goal, it is not their only option. The Mexican drug cartels have reached such strength that the Mexican government’s control over large portions of the country is an open question. Failure of the Mexican state is something that must be considered even before the Russians get involved. And simply doing with the Mexican cartels what the Soviets once did with anti-American militant groups the world over could suffice to tip the balance.

In many regards, Mexico as a failed state would be a worse result for Washington than a hostile united Mexico. A hostile Mexico could be intimidated, sanctioned or even invaded, effectively browbeaten into submission. But a failed Mexico would not restrict the drug trade at all. The border would be chaos, and the implications of that go well beyond drugs. One of the United States’ largest trading partners could well devolve into a seething anarchy that could not help but leak into the U.S. proper.

Whether Mexico becomes staunchly anti-American or devolves into the violent chaos of a failed state does not matter much to the Russians. Either one would threaten the United States with a staggering problem that no amount of resources could quickly or easily fix. And the Russians right now are shopping around for staggering problems with which to threaten the United States.
In terms of cost-benefit analysis, all of these options are no-brainers. Threatening naval interdiction simply requires a few jets. Encouraging the drug trade can be done with a few weapons shipments. Destabilizing a country just requires some creativity. However, countering such activities requires a massive outlay of intelligence and military assets — often into areas that are politically and militarily hostile, if not outright inaccessible. In many ways, this is containment in reverse.

Old Opportunities, New Twists

In Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega has proven so enthusiastic in his nostalgia for Cold War alignments that Nicaragua has already recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two territories in the former Soviet state (and U.S. ally) of Georgia that Russia went to war to protect. That makes Nicaragua the only country in the world other than Russia to recognize the breakaway regions. Moscow is quite obviously pleased — and was undoubtedly working the system behind the scenes.

In Bolivia, President Evo Morales is attempting to rewrite the laws that govern his country’s wealth distribution in favor of his poor supporters in the indigenous highlands. Now, a belt of conflict separates those highlands, which are roughly centered at the pro-Morales city of Cochabamba, from the wealthier, more Europeanized lowlands. A civil war is brewing — a conflict that is just screaming for outside interference, as similar fights did during the Cold War. It is likely only a matter of time before the headlines become splattered with pictures of Kalashnikov-wielding Cochabambinos decrying American imperialism.

Yet while the winds of history are blowing in the same old channels, there certainly are variations on the theme. The Mexican cartels, for one, were radically weaker beasts the last time around, and their current strength and disruptive capabilities present the Russians with new options.

So does Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a man so anti-American he seems to be even a few steps ahead of Kremlin propagandists. In recent days, Chavez has already hosted long-range Russian strategic bombers and evicted the U.S. ambassador. A glance at a map indicates that Venezuela is a far superior basing point than Grenada for threatening the Panama Canal. Additionally, Chavez’s Venezuela has already indicated both its willingness to get militarily involved in the Bolivian conflict and its willingness to act as a weapons smuggler via links to the FARC — and that without any heretofore detected Russian involvement. The opportunities for smuggling networks — both old and new — using Venezuela as a base are robust.

Not all changes since the Cold War are good for Russia, however. Cuba is not as blindly pro-Russian as it once was. While Russian hurricane aid to Cuba is a bid to reopen old doors, the Cubans are noticeably hesitant. Between the ailing of Fidel Castro and the presence of the world’s largest market within spitting distance, the emerging Cuban regime is not going to reflexively side with the Russians for peanuts. In Soviet times, Cuba traded massive Soviet subsidies in exchange for its allegiance. A few planeloads of hurricane aid simply won’t pay the bills in Havana, and it is still unclear how much money the Russians are willing to come up with.

There is also the question of Brazil. Long gone is the dysfunctional state; Brazil is now an emerging industrial powerhouse with an energy company, Petroleo Brasileiro, of skill levels that outshine anything the Russians have yet conquered in that sphere. While Brazilian rhetoric has always claimed that Brazil was just about to come of age, it now happens to be true. A rising Brazil is feeling its strength and tentatively pushing its influence into the border states of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, as well as into regional rivals Venezuela and Argentina. Russian intervention tends to appeal to those who do not feel they have meaningful control over their own neighborhoods. Brazil no longer fits into that category, and it will not appreciate Russia’s mucking around in its neighborhood.

A few weeks ago, Stratfor published a piece detailing how U.S. involvement in the Iraq war was winding to a close. We received many comments from readers applauding our optimism. We are afraid that we were misinterpreted. “New” does not mean “bright” or “better,” but simply different. And the dawning struggle in Latin America is an example of the sort of “different” that the United States can look forward to in the years ahead. Buckle up.

This piece has been courtesy stratfor

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Summary of DEBKAfile Exclusives in the Week Ending Aug. 28, 2008

Summary of DEBKAfile Exclusives in the Week Ending Aug. 28, 2008
Cutting out US role, new Egyptian-Saudi plan proposes inter-Arab force for Gaza takeover DEBKAfile Exclusive Report

23 Aug.: DEBKAfile’s military sources report that a new 11-point scheme, just developed by Saudi King Abdullah and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, provides for the bulk of the 3,000-strong force to be Egyptian.
The plan would effectively restore Egypt’s pre-1967 dominion over the Gaza Strip. Hamas is offered a political comeback on the West Bank and a seat on the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO’s) ruling institutions.When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s arrives in Jerusalem and Ramallah, Sunday, Aug. 24, she will find this plan on the table for Egypt (speaking also for Saudi Arabia), Israel and the Palestinian Authority. If Israel accepted the Egyptian-Saudi blueprint, its 1979 peace treaty with Cairo would have to be revised, especially the demilitarization provisions. A parallel proposal would appoint Jordan as overseer of Palestinian government institutions and security forces on the West Bank.DEBKAfile’s sources reveal here some of the new plan’s key points:- The rival Palestinian Hamas and Fatah must end their vendetta. - Hamas must hand Gaza’s ruling institutions back seized two years ago to the Palestinian Authority.- Hamas must suspend the operations of its militia and police forces.- Inter-Arab monitors, headed by Egyptian officers, will supervise the Gaza police force.- A panel headed by Egyptian officers will compile a reform program for the Palestinian security bodies in Gaza, effectively removing them from Hamas’ hands.- In the interim, an inter-Arab force of 3,000, commanded by Egyptian security officers, will be in charge of security matters.- A provisional nonpartisan Palestinian government will be installed in Ramallah in place of the Salam Fayad administration.

Egypt on top alert for major al Qaeda attack DEBKAfile Exclusive Report
24 Aug.: DEBKAfile’s intelligence and counter-terror sources disclose that Egypt’s interior ministry’s security forces, airports, harbors, and border terminals were placed on the highest terror alert Sunday afternoon, Aug. 24, in response to information that an al Qaeda team or teams were heading for major strikes against specific targets. Our sources report that the warning received in Cairo referred to governing institutions, military installations and Suez Canal facilities.Extra guards were posted at the American, Israeli, Swedish and British embassies in Cairo. Security forces have been boosted at the three main Suez Canal cities, Port Said, Ismailya and Suez, as well as the Sinai resorts of Sharm el Sheikh, Dahab and Nueiba, which are packed with late holidaymakers. In April 2006, al Qaeda detonated three bombs at the coastal resort of Dahab, killing 23 people – all Egyptian and injuring 60.

Government criticized for releasing Palestinian terrorists24 Aug.: Israel freed 199 jailed Palestinian terrorists Monday as a gesture of support for Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. They included mastermind of Jerusalem market attack convicted for life 30 years ago and a second terrorist “with blood on his hands.” The government was criticized for letting terrorists free for nothing while Gilead Shalit is still held by Hamas.

Explosion cuts Azerbaijan-Georgia-Europe fuel railway link DEBKAfile Special Report
24 Aug.: The train Sunday, Aug. 24, hit a mine at the village of Skra, 5 km west of Gori on the main track of the railway line linking Eastern and Western Georgia – a vital trade route for oil exports from Azerbaijan to European markets. The blast deals a serious blow to Georgia’s efforts to recover from its ten-day war over South Ossetia. Azerbaijan restored its oil consignments via Georgia only two days ago; their interruption during the fighting robbed the Saakasvhili government of valuable revenue, which has again been suspended by the attack. The guided missile destroyer USS McFaul docked at the Georgian port of Batumi carrying blankets, hygiene kits and baby food. Two more US ships are due to dock later this week. The vessels were supposed to have put in at the Black Sea port of Poti, 80 km to the north, but changed direction to avoid friction with the Russian troops in control of Poti further up the coast.
As sparks fly, Cheney to visit Georgia, Iwo Jima sails for Middle East

25 Aug.: The Georgian conflict over South Ossetia is spiraling into a contest between the US and Russia over control of the Black Sea region and the eastern Mediterranean. The US Vice President Dick Cheney will stop over in Georgia, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Italy during a trip starting Sept. 2. President Bush “felt it was important to have the vice president consult with allies in the region on our common security interests.” This was Washington’s response to the decision taken by the Russian Navy chief, Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky - disclosed earlier by DEBKAfile - to place its warships bound for Syria’s Mediterranean port of Tartus under the command of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol. At the same time, the American aircraft carrier, the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group, heading a six-vessel contingent, sets sail Tuesday for the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. Tehran reported the Russian and Iranian presidents would meet at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s summit taking place in Dushanbe, Tajikistan Thursday and Friday, Aug. 28-29.

Jerusalem Arabs pose as Palestinian cops

25 Aug.: Seven Jerusalem Arabs were caught impersonating Palestinian police officers. They were found making unlawful arrests of civilians at gunpoint, handing them on to Palestinian authorities in Ramallah for questioning, or holding them to ransom. The gang operated out of the northern Jerusalem suburb of Shoefat.

Russian Mediterranean warships placed under Moscow’s Black Sea Fleet command

25 Aug.: The Russian Navy chief, Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky announced Sunday, Aug. 24, that its warships in the Mediterranean region have been placed under the command of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, causing extreme concern in Israel’s military and navy.At the same time, the American aircraft carrier, the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group heading a six-vessel contingent set sail for the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, with 6,000 sailors and marines aboard. Washington and Jerusalem regard the link-up of Russian naval operations in the two waters a further aggressive Russian step in the spreading Cold War.Moscow’s announcement Monday that Russian forces would search cargoes transiting Poti underscored its determination to retain its grip on the strategic Black Sea port. Cont. Next Columm

In the Mediterranean, US and Israeli satellites have recently observed large dredgers operating at the Syrian port of Tartus. They are believed to be preparing the small port to serve as permanent base for large Russian naval vessels, including the Admiral Kuznetsov, right opposite the US Sixth Fleet and in close proximity to Israeli waters and shores.
Medvedev “not afraid of Cold War” after approving Georgian regions’ independence
26 Aug.: President George W. Bush said Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence exacerbates tensions and complicates negotiations. The Russian president warned of “military responses” to the US missile shield in Europe.Signing the decrees, Russian president Dimitry Medvedev said Tuesday, Aug. 26, Russia is prepared to go any length to defend the enclaves. “We are not afraid of anything, including the prospect of a Cold War,” he said.DEBKAfile's Moscow sources report the Kremlin is planning further sanctions against Georgia and its US-NATO backers, possibly in Eastern Europe.UK foreign secretary David Miliband called for the “widest possible” international coalition against Russian aggression in Georgia.
US to ship aid through Russian-controlled Georgian port of Poti26 Aug.: The Black Sea confrontation between Russia and the US-led NATO forces predicted by DEBKAfile last week is building up inexorably to a climax. In Moscow, DEBKAfile’s military sources report, Capt. Igor Dygalo, deputy commander of the Russian Navy, announced the Moskva missile cruiser would carry out a naval exercise on the Black Sea.The Russians are clearly marking out their control of the Black Sea in the face of the USS McFaul guided missile destroyer’s arrival with aid for Georgia. It carried 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of striking land and sea targets.

Barak heard Mubarak’s briefing on new Gaza plan

26 Aug.: The Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak wanted to hear about progress in Egyptian mediation for the release of the Israeli soldier kidnapped in 2006 by Hamas, Gilead Shalit. However, DEBKAfile reports that when he arrived in Alexandria Tuesday, Aug. 26, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak first laid before him the 11-point scheme he and Saudi king Abdullah have developed for the Gaza Strip.

A 3,000-strong Egyptian force would effectively displace Hamas government and restore Cairo’s pre-1967 War dominion over the enclave. This plan is subject to Israel’s approval as the deployment would breach the demilitarized clauses of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace accord. Cairo is expected to delay the Shalit case until this plan goes through.Monday night, Barak stressed before visiting US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice that Israel has not given up on a military option to pre-empt Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb.

Moscow warns NATO against sending more ships to Black Sea, cautions Moldova
27 Aug.: America’s decision to redirect its Georgia aid warship from Russian-controlled Poti port to Georgian-controlled Batumi Wednesday, August 27 did not cool the escalating tension between the two powers. No sooner had the US Coast Guard cutter Dallas docked, when three Russian missile boats, led by the Moskva missile cruiser, anchored at the Black Sea port of Sukhumi, to the north, while Moscow warned Western nations against sending more ships.According to DEBKAfile’s military sources, ten NATO warships are present in the Black Sea – American, Turkish, German, Spanish and Polish. Alliance sources have said more vessels would soon be deployed raising the number to eighteen. Moldova, another former Soviet Black Sea nation, is the latest target of Russian threats. Russian ambassador Valeri Kuzmin advised Moldova’s leaders to avoid a “bloody and catastrophic trend of events.” He said Moscow had recognizes South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence the day before, because of “Georgian’s aggression.” G7 foreign ministers deplored Russia’s “excessive use of force” in Georgia and condemned its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Hizballah high-up falls to his death at rocket launch pad on Israeli border

27 Aug.: The geography of the accident Tuesday, Aug. 26, belied the reiterated claims of Israeli ministers and UN officials that Hizballah’s rockets had been pushed back from the Lebanese-Israeli border. DEBKAfile’s military sources confirm that, not only has Hizballah returned to its old positions on the Israeli border, but the Iran-backed Shiite terrorists are working feverishly on the construction of a new array of fortified military positions and rocket-launching pads right on top of the Israeli border fence. They are not disturbed by Israel’s army or UN peacekeepers.When Israel’s security cabinet convened to discuss homeland defenses in an emergency on Wednesday, Dep. defense minister, Matan Vilnai, said every corner of Israel was now within range of enemy missiles. Syrian and Hizballah arsenals hold tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, which are an even greater danger than Iranian missiles. His Homeland Defense Authority would soon present proposals for improving security on the home front, which would be “primarily legislative.”That is the root of the problem, say DEBKAfile’s military sources. Why were Israeli forces not instructed to destroy these convoys and blow up the missile dumps?

Russia successfully tests ICBM designed to overcome anti-missile systems

28 Aug.: Reporting this Thurs. Aug. 28, Alexander Vovk, spokesman for Russia’s strategic nuclear forces said the Topol RS-12M was tested to “develop equipment for potential combat and use against ground-based missiles.”Earlier this week, amid the crisis over Georgia, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev warned of a military response to the US missile shield installed in Europe.DEBKAfile’s military sources report the Topol RS-12M ballistic missile (NATO codenamed SS-25 Sickle) is a new piece of equipment which Russian generals have said Moscow is working on to pierce any missile shield the US could make.

The above report is courtesy Debkafile

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Russia’s Sphere of Influence Engulfing Kazakhstan

August 26, 2008 From theTrumpet.comKazakhs, watching events in Georgia, seem to be aligning their energy-export policy with Putin’s wishes.

Russian tank treads rolling all over Georgia is making another regional country besides Ukraine stand up and take notice: Kazakhstan. Along with other factors, Moscow’s resurging pressure on its former Soviet neighbors has the Central Asian republic considering its options, particularly in one of its most vital sectors: energy.

Turkish daily Referans reported August 21 that Kazakhstan may soon decide to pump its oil through Russian pipelines instead of shipping it in tankers to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in Azerbaijan, which bypasses Russia. For several years, Kazakhstan has sought to reduce its reliance on Russia for getting its energy exports to market. According to Stratfor sources there, this decision could be the first signal that Kazakhstan is abandoning its plan to diversify its energy options away from Russia’s sphere of influence (August 21).

Kazakhstan, a landlocked former Soviet republic of 15 million people, has an economy larger than all the other Central Asian states combined thanks to its natural energy resources. It has long cooperated with Moscow over Western influences—partially out of mutual interests, partially out of intimidation. Its capital, Astana, lies 6,000 miles away from Washington and thousands of miles from Western Europe, with Russia’s Volga region and a few nervous former Soviet satellite countries in between. A third of its population is ethnic Russian, and it shares 4,250 nice, flat, invadable miles of border with its northern neighbor.

In addition, a large Kazakh population works in Russia and sends earnings back to Kazakhstan, and the nation’s energy infrastructure and transportation networks still run on Soviet models, which are Russia-bound.

But, at the same time, Moscow has the inconvenient tendency of crushing its weaker neighbors under Red Army combat boot heels. So Astana has looked for other energy options to diversify its portfolio. Russia’s bloody sortie into Georgia accomplishes more than just sending a strong statement to Astana and all the other former Soviet satellites. In real terms, it also means that Moscow is in control of Georgia and any energy exports that would potentially flow through it. It just so happens that Kazakhstan was considering building the Aktau-Baku pipeline across the bottom of the Caspian Sea. The idea was that it would reduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia. So much for that idea.

Now, Kazakhstan has even fewer non-Russia energy options. Its only other real option is China, but at the moment Kazakhstan exports only 13 percent of its oil to its southeastern neighbor.
So, Kazakhstan will potentially pump its petroleum through Russian pipelines. What is the significance? The significance is that Russia will now grasp even more Asian energy exports, weapons that, along with its dominating foreign policy, project Moscow’s sphere of influence larger and larger. The effect is rippling far beyond shell-shocked Georgians. And it is paying dividends. As men in Moscow continue to increase their power using their two favorite weapons, the Red Army and energy exports—and as the U.S. does little more than blandly watch it all happen on TV—the Asian others will be forced to fall into lockstep.

With increasing Chinese-Russian cooperation coming down the line, the two gigantic powers of Asia will be able to tell Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the other ‘Stans, Japan, and most of the rest of the continent exactly what they can and must do with their resources. For more on the future of Asia, read Russia and China in Prophecy

These and more available at thetrumpet.com

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Georgia and Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis August 25 2008

August 25, 2008


By George Friedman
The Russo-Georgian war was rooted in broad geopolitical processes. In large part it was simply the result of the cyclical reassertion of Russian power. The Russian empire — czarist and Soviet — expanded to its borders in the 17th and 19th centuries. It collapsed in 1992. The Western powers wanted to make the disintegration permanent. It was inevitable that Russia would, in due course, want to reassert its claims. That it happened in Georgia was simply the result of circumstance.

There is, however, another context within which to view this, the context of Russian perceptions of U.S. and European intentions and of U.S. and European perceptions of Russian capabilities. This context shaped the policies that led to the Russo-Georgian war. And those attitudes can only be understood if we trace the question of Kosovo, because the Russo-Georgian war was forged over the last decade over the Kosovo question.

Yugoslavia broke up into its component republics in the early 1990s. The borders of the republics did not cohere to the distribution of nationalities. Many — Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and so on — found themselves citizens of republics where the majorities were not of their ethnicities and disliked the minorities intensely for historical reasons. Wars were fought between Croatia and Serbia (still calling itself Yugoslavia because Montenegro was part of it), Bosnia and Serbia and Bosnia and Croatia. Other countries in the region became involved as well.

One conflict became particularly brutal. Bosnia had a large area dominated by Serbs. This region wanted to secede from Bosnia and rejoin Serbia. The Bosnians objected and an internal war in Bosnia took place, with the Serbian government involved. This war involved the single greatest bloodletting of the bloody Balkan wars, the mass murder by Serbs of Bosnians.

Here we must pause and define some terms that are very casually thrown around. Genocide is the crime of trying to annihilate an entire people. War crimes are actions that violate the rules of war. If a soldier shoots a prisoner, he has committed a war crime. Then there is a class called “crimes against humanity.” It is intended to denote those crimes that are too vast to be included in normal charges of murder or rape. They may not involve genocide, in that the annihilation of a race or nation is not at stake, but they may also go well beyond war crimes, which are much lesser offenses. The events in Bosnia were reasonably deemed crimes against humanity. They did not constitute genocide and they were more than war crimes.

At the time, the Americans and Europeans did nothing about these crimes, which became an internal political issue as the magnitude of the Serbian crimes became clear. In this context, the Clinton administration helped negotiate the Dayton Accords, which were intended to end the Balkan wars and indeed managed to go quite far in achieving this. The Dayton Accords were built around the principle that there could be no adjustment in the borders of the former Yugoslav republics. Ethnic Serbs would live under Bosnian rule. The principle that existing borders were sacrosanct was embedded in the Dayton Accords.

In the late 1990s, a crisis began to develop in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Over the years, Albanians had moved into the province in a broad migration. By 1997, the province was overwhelmingly Albanian, although it had not only been historically part of Serbia but also its historical foundation. Nevertheless, the Albanians showed significant intentions of moving toward either a separate state or unification with Albania. Serbia moved to resist this, increasing its military forces and indicating an intention to crush the Albanian resistance.

There were many claims that the Serbians were repeating the crimes against humanity that were committed in Bosnia. The Americans and Europeans, burned by Bosnia, were eager to demonstrate their will. Arguing that something between crimes against humanity and genocide was under way — and citing reports that between 10,000 and 100,000 Kosovo Albanians were missing or had been killed — NATO launched a campaign designed to stop the killings. In fact, while some killings had taken place, the claims by NATO of the number already killed were false. NATO might have prevented mass murder in Kosovo. That is not provable. They did not, however, find that mass murder on the order of the numbers claimed had taken place. The war could be defended as a preventive measure, but the atmosphere under which the war was carried out overstated what had happened.

The campaign was carried out without U.N. sanction because of Russian and Chinese opposition. The Russians were particularly opposed, arguing that major crimes were not being committed and that Serbia was an ally of Russia and that the air assault was not warranted by the evidence. The United States and other European powers disregarded the Russian position. Far more important, they established the precedent that U.N. sanction was not needed to launch a war (a precedent used by George W. Bush in Iraq). Rather — and this is the vital point — they argued that NATO support legitimized the war.

This transformed NATO from a military alliance into a quasi-United Nations. What happened in Kosovo was that NATO took on the role of peacemaker, empowered to determine if intervention was necessary, allowed to make the military intervention, and empowered to determine the outcome. Conceptually, NATO was transformed from a military force into a regional multinational grouping with responsibility for maintenance of regional order, even within the borders of states that are not members. If the United Nations wouldn’t support the action, the NATO Council was sufficient.

Since Russia was not a member of NATO, and since Russia denied the urgency of war, and since Russia was overruled, the bombing campaign against Kosovo created a crisis in relations with Russia. The Russians saw the attack as a unilateral attack by an anti-Russian alliance on a Russian ally, without sound justification. Then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin was not prepared to make this into a major confrontation, nor was he in a position to. The Russians did not so much acquiesce as concede they had no options.

The war did not go as well as history records. The bombing campaign did not force capitulation and NATO was not prepared to invade Kosovo. The air campaign continued inconclusively as the West turned to the Russians to negotiate an end. The Russians sent an envoy who negotiated an agreement consisting of three parts. First, the West would halt the bombing campaign. Second, Serbian army forces would withdraw and be replaced by a multinational force including Russian troops. Third, implicit in the agreement, the Russian troops would be there to guarantee Serbian interests and sovereignty.

As soon as the agreement was signed, the Russians rushed troops to the Pristina airport to take up their duties in the multinational force — as they had in the Bosnian peacekeeping force. In part because of deliberate maneuvers and in part because no one took the Russians seriously, the Russians never played the role they believed had been negotiated. They were never seen as part of the peacekeeping operation or as part of the decision-making system over Kosovo. The Russians felt doubly betrayed, first by the war itself, then by the peace arrangements.

The Kosovo war directly effected the fall of Yeltsin and the rise of Vladimir Putin. The faction around Putin saw Yeltsin as an incompetent bungler who allowed Russia to be doubly betrayed. The Russian perception of the war directly led to the massive reversal in Russian policy we see today. The installation of Putin and Russian nationalists from the former KGB had a number of roots. But fundamentally it was rooted in the events in Kosovo. Most of all it was driven by the perception that NATO had now shifted from being a military alliance to seeing itself as a substitute for the United Nations, arbitrating regional politics. Russia had no vote or say in NATO decisions, so NATO’s new role was seen as a direct challenge to Russian interests.
Thus, the ongoing expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union and the promise to include Ukraine and Georgia into NATO were seen in terms of the Kosovo war. From the Russian point of view, NATO expansion meant a further exclusion of Russia from decision-making, and implied that NATO reserved the right to repeat Kosovo if it felt that human rights or political issues required it. The United Nations was no longer the prime multinational peacekeeping entity. NATO assumed that role in the region and now it was going to expand all around Russia.

Then came Kosovo’s independence. Yugoslavia broke apart into its constituent entities, but the borders of its nations didn’t change. Then, for the first time since World War II, the decision was made to change Serbia’s borders, in opposition to Serbian and Russian wishes, with the authorizing body, in effect, being NATO. It was a decision avidly supported by the Americans.
The initial attempt to resolve Kosovo’s status was the round of negotiations led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari that officially began in February 2006 but had been in the works since 2005. This round of negotiations was actually started under U.S. urging and closely supervised from Washington. In charge of keeping Ahtisaari’s negotiations running smoothly was Frank G. Wisner, a diplomat during the Clinton administration. Also very important to the U.S. effort was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, another leftover from the Clinton administration and a specialist in Soviet and Polish affairs.

In the summer of 2007, when it was obvious that the negotiations were going nowhere, the Bush administration decided the talks were over and that it was time for independence. On June 10, 2007, Bush said that the end result of negotiations must be “certain independence.” In July 2007, Daniel Fried said that independence was “inevitable” even if the talks failed. Finally, in September 2007, Condoleezza Rice put it succinctly: “There’s going to be an independent Kosovo. We’re dedicated to that.” Europeans took cues from this line.

How and when independence was brought about was really a European problem. The Americans set the debate and the Europeans implemented it. Among Europeans, the most enthusiastic about Kosovo independence were the British and the French. The British followed the American line while the French were led by their foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, who had also served as the U.N. Kosovo administrator. The Germans were more cautiously supportive.

On Feb. 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized rapidly by a small number of European states and countries allied with the United States. Even before the declaration, the Europeans had created an administrative body to administer Kosovo. The Europeans, through the European Union, micromanaged the date of the declaration.

On May 15, during a conference in Ekaterinburg, the foreign ministers of India, Russia and China made a joint statement regarding Kosovo. It was read by the Russian host minister, Sergei Lavrov, and it said: “In our statement, we recorded our fundamental position that the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo contradicts Resolution 1244. Russia, India and China encourage Belgrade and Pristina to resume talks within the framework of international law and hope they reach an agreement on all problems of that Serbian territory.”

The Europeans and Americans rejected this request as they had rejected all Russian arguments on Kosovo. The argument here was that the Kosovo situation was one of a kind because of atrocities that had been committed. The Russians argued that the level of atrocity was unclear and that, in any case, the government that committed them was long gone from Belgrade. More to the point, the Russians let it be clearly known that they would not accept the idea that Kosovo independence was a one-of-a-kind situation and that they would regard it, instead, as a new precedent for all to follow.

The problem was not that the Europeans and the Americans didn’t hear the Russians. The problem was that they simply didn’t believe them — they didn’t take the Russians seriously. They had heard the Russians say things for many years. They did not understand three things. First, that the Russians had reached the end of their rope. Second, that Russian military capability was not what it had been in 1999. Third, and most important, NATO, the Americans and the Europeans did not recognize that they were making political decisions that they could not support militarily.

For the Russians, the transformation of NATO from a military alliance into a regional United Nations was the problem. The West argued that NATO was no longer just a military alliance but a political arbitrator for the region. If NATO does not like Serbian policies in Kosovo, it can — at its option and in opposition to U.N. rulings — intervene. It could intervene in Serbia and it intended to expand deep into the former Soviet Union. NATO thought that because it was now a political arbiter encouraging regimes to reform and not just a war-fighting system, Russian fears would actually be assuaged. To the contrary, it was Russia’s worst nightmare. Compensating for all this was the fact that NATO had neglected its own military power. Now, Russia could do something about it.

At the beginning of this discourse, we explained that the underlying issues behind the Russo-Georgian war went deep into geopolitics and that it could not be understood without understanding Kosovo. It wasn’t everything, but it was the single most significant event behind all of this. The war of 1999 was the framework that created the war of 2008.

The problem for NATO was that it was expanding its political reach and claims while contracting its military muscle. The Russians were expanding their military capability (after 1999 they had no place to go but up) and the West didn’t notice. In 1999, the Americans and Europeans made political decisions backed by military force. In 2008, in Kosovo, they made political decisions without sufficient military force to stop a Russian response. Either they underestimated their adversary or — even more amazingly — they did not see the Russians as adversaries despite absolutely clear statements the Russians had made. No matter what warning the Russians gave, or what the history of the situation was, the West couldn’t take the Russians seriously.
It began in 1999 with war in Kosovo and it ended in 2008 with the independence of Kosovo. When we study the history of the coming period, the war in Kosovo will stand out as a turning point. Whatever the humanitarian justification and the apparent ease of victory, it set the stage for the rise of Putin and the current and future crises.

The above report has been courtesy stratfor

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The Week in Review

« (PT/Getty Images)

The Week in Review
August 23, 2008 From theTrumpet.comRussia’s war against Georgia ripples across continents, Berlin and Moscow are making the pact we’ve been anticipating for decades, and U.S. leaders are realizing what the Trumpet has said for years: America lacks will.

Middle East
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf resigned August 18. The Pakistani parliament had initiated impeachment proceedings against him on charges of conspiring against the nation’s democratic transition. Musharraf’s ouster from politics creates a power vacuum in this nuclear-armed Muslim country. The current Pakistani government is based on a coalition of the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League—two rival parties that have been united only in their disdain for Musharraf. With Musharraf gone, governmental instability will increase and Pakistan will be up for grabs.

The Israeli government agreed August 17 to release about 200 Fatah prisoners, including some involved in the murder of Israelis. According to a statement released by the Prime Minister’s Office, “This is a gesture and a trust-building move aimed at bolstering the moderates in the Palestinian Authority and the peace process.” If the so-called moderates in the Palestinian Authority (PA) were really moderate, however, they would not want Israel to release terrorists. The reason the PA wants these people released is so it can score points among a Palestinian population that is sympathetic to terrorists.

Iran claimed it successfully launched a “dummy” satellite aboard a multiple-stage satellite-launch vehicle August 16, and two days later offered to help other Muslim countries launch their own satellites. Though the United States reported that the Iranian launch failed, it still demonstrates progress in Tehran’s missile program. “It is now clear that Tehran is tinkering with what appears to be a workable design based on North Korean experience that incorporates a second stage,” wrote Stratfor (August 19). This means—when Iran has mastered the second stage—it will have extended the reach of its missiles.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia last week, and its aftermath, could make U.S. involvement in the Middle East far more difficult. Russia is a major arms supplier to Iran, is assisting it in its nuclear program, and is protecting Iran through its veto power in the UN Security Council. As such, the Russians could make it much more difficult for the U.S. to take any meaningful action against Iran. Certainly, if the U.S. were to put any pressure on Russia, Moscow could simply increase arms sales and nuclear cooperation with Tehran. Even the threat of new sanctions—which were on the table at the time of the Georgia invasion—has suddenly become less real, seeing as the sanctions would be ineffective without Russia on board. Then there is Iraq: If Iran starts feeling more confident with Russia at its side, it could once again turn up the heat there. The Americans simply need the Russians more than the Russians need the Americans. Hence the U.S.’s lack of any effective response to Russia’s aggression in Georgia.

Syria is also trying to take advantage of Russia’s resurgence to strengthen its security, with President Bashar Assad visiting Moscow this week to meet with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

Europe
Hostilities between Russia and the West continued to escalate this week. Poland formally agreed to host a U.S. missile interception base on its territory. As part of the agreement, signed Thursday, the U.S. also agreed to come to Poland’s aid “in case of military or other threats.” Russia responded quickly. “Russia in this case will have to react, and not only through diplomatic protests,” said a statement from the ministry, according to Reuters. Attitudes toward the missile deal flipped 180 degrees after Russia’s invasion of Georgia. Before the war, 70 percent of Poles surveyed were against building the missile base on Polish soil. Now, 63 percent support an America military presence in Poland. “The war in Georgia very quickly and suddenly changed the mood of Poles,” said political analyst Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas. “In a week, a strong majority emerged supporting the American missile shield in Poland.” According to another poll, half of Poland fears a Russian attack. Only 38 percent said they were not afraid. As Russia grows more aggressive, watch for fear to motivate European countries to forge a similar alliance to the one Poland and the U.S. have just signed.

Poland and the U.S. may not be the only countries making deals, however. Germany may have another way to deal with the rising power in the east. Stratfor wrote, “Stratfor sources in Moscow have said that Medvedev has offered Merkel a security pact for their two countries. This offer is completely unconfirmed, and the details are unknown. However, it would make sense for Russia to propose such a pact since Moscow knows that, of all the European countries, Germany is the one to pursue—not only because of the country’s vulnerabilities and strong economic ties with Russia but because the two have a history of cozying up to each other.” They point out that most of the world thought it was impossible for Germany and Russia to ally in the 1930s. Once again a German-Russia back-room deal could shock the world, and signal the arrival of a very independent Germany.

Consumer optimism in Germany is at a five-year low, a survey revealed this week. Forty-five percent of Germans believe the economy is declining, compared to 26 percent who thought this way in June, according to zdf television. The Germans’ worries seem reasonable. The eurozone’s economy shrank by 0.2 percent in the three-month period ending on June 30. This is the first quarterly shrinkage since the euro was first introduced in 1999. Germany’s economy, the largest in Europe, shrank by 0.5 percent, and France’s by 0.3 percent. Europe’s economic woes, though, should worry the whole world. Last time Germany’s economy got into serious trouble, a right-wing madman used the unrest to get into power.

Asia
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda broke with his predecessors on Friday of last week when he refused to visit a controversial shrine dedicated to 14 Japanese war criminals that were executed after World War ii. Instead, Fukuda placated China by attending a separate ceremony where he expressed his remorse for the pain and suffering Japan inflicted on other nations during the war. This kowtow to Beijing is the latest of a series of demonstrations of how Japan is now relying on its historic rival, China, as an ally. Now that China has replaced the United States as Japan’s biggest customer, expect Japan to rely even further on its Asian neighbors at it becomes less and less dependent on the United States.

Africa, South America
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe intends to convene parliament next Tuesday, jeopardizing any chance for a resolution to his country’s political and economic crisis. Morgan Tsvangirai—who won the first round of presidential elections but has been embroiled in a violent political crisis—says this is a violation of power-sharing talks and that Mugabe “may have abandoned the basis for the talks.” The two are currently at loggerheads over the roles of the prime minister and president, with neither wanting to find himself in a ceremonial role. Tsvangirai visited Kenya, where a similar political explosion erupted following an election at the end of last year, to seek advice from Prime Minister Raila Odinga this week. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe continues its economic slide, with inflation an estimated 11 million percent. For more about political violence in Africa, read “The Unseen Danger in Political Violence” from the April Trumpet.

Mexican President Felipe Calderon held a security meeting August 21 to address the rise in kidnappings and drug-related murders. bbc News reports that there is an average of 65 kidnappings per month, but because many may be paying the ransom to free their loved ones, the real number may be much higher. More than 2,600 have died in drug-related violence so far this year. President Calderon has dispatched more than 30,000 soldiers across the country since 2007, but that measure has not been effective. Public marches in response to the kidnappings are planned for August 30. But the drug war cannot be won with marches and security meetings. For a real solution, read Joel Hilliker’s June 25 article “A Key to Winning the Drug War” on theTrumpet.com.

Anglo-America
Powerful storms are again pounding Florida, with floodwaters trapping residents and rising as high as 5 feet in some places. The storm, which had threatened to become a hurricane, has stalled over central Florida and continues to dump inches of rain onto Floridians. Expect more storms in the future, not less, with increasingly greater severity.
America’s need to have the will to win a war was breaking news Thursday morning. A Washington Times exclusive reported that Republican presidential hopeful John McCain sent a private letter to President George W. Bush in late 2006 challenging him to show the “will” to win the Iraq war with a 20,000-troop surge into the Sunni Triangle in Iraq. President Bush, who had resisted the idea for more than three years, now praised his potential successor’s judgment, saying that the troop surge has worked. The effect of this carefully timed political maneuver on any candidate’s political fortune is irrelevant compared to the larger news: Some of America’s leaders are glimpsing—if just barely—the real emergency: a crisis of will. Even the current administration, ardently opposed by more than half the country as being too “aggressive,” has had trouble summoning the will to stabilize Iraq, and has zero willpower to even fight Russia’s assault on the U.S.’s ally Georgia, let alone win. It remains to be seen how much America’s leaders will wake up to what Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry has stressed for nearly two decades: that the U.S. lacks the will to win—and now lacks even the will to fight. Check the basis for this perceptive forecast in Leviticus 26:19, where God says He will break the willpower of the nation that rebels against Him.

Another student has been murdered at school. At 8:11 a.m. on Thursday, a student walked into Central High School in Knoxville, Tennessee, and shot a fellow student. The victim died later that day; police say the shooting was intentional and the student who died was purposefully targeted.
In economic news, Bloomberg reported that crude oil jumped $5 due to the falling dollar and fears that the U.S.-Poland missile shield pact signed Wednesday could agitate Russia and cause it to disrupt oil flows. BP has already shut down the Baku-Supsa pipeline due to concerns and damage resulting from the Russian invasion of Georgia. •

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A New Russia
Many would have believed that the death of the Soviet Union brought about the birth of a new Russia. But one question we should really ask is has Russia really changed?
Political Scientist Hans Morgenthau describes Russia's national character. "In Russia the tradition of obedience to the authority of the government and the traditional fear of the foreigner has made large permanent military establishments acceptable to the population"(Politics Among Nations).
Russia's government has been authoritarian throughout history, under the House of Rurik remembered through Tsar Ivan IV [ the terrible] through to the house of Romanov. Russia has been ruled by totalitarian monarchy.
By 1914 Russians had grown tired of autocratic rule with the effects of World war I, the suffering and the dashed hopes resulted in the the October 1917 revolution ending the Russian monarchy. In 1929, Stalin emerged victor in the battle for supremacy amongst the three; Lenin,Trotsky. Lenin died in 1924 and Trotsky was exiled in South America.
With the failure of Gorbachevs initiative in liberalizing the Socio-economic structure and the CIA-Vatican interference in Poland which effectively resulted in the dissolution of the USSR by 1991. A Western -style private enterprise system was sought to be established in Russia with the unwanted result of power and wealth going into the hands of only a few people- The Oligarchs.
Putin elected in March 2000 moved the country in the way that he deemed would awaken Mother Russia, reining in the control of all government agencies, Putin has implemented a game -plan of using the West to rebuild Russia. Realizing that Russia's chief asset is its Oil it is only natural that we should expect Russia to seek control of its oil assets to put itself back into World consciousness that it still matters in World affairs.
And with the hand-picking of the new Russian president Dmitri Medvedev by Putin and He being the Prime Minister, we can be sure that Russia would put itself back into World reckoning.

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My first post

This is my very first post and i guess i should give you a rundown of what my blog is about. i will post world news events that really matter for our world.

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